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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PENNY LEONA MACKEY, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT KENNETH MACKEY, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
CaseNo.20010158-CA 
Trial Court No. 994700013 DA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 et. seq, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h), 
and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The trial court erred in not allowing more time for the respondent under the 
rules of discovery. 
Applicable Standard of Review. Where the trial court has erroneously denied a 
discovery request, the appellant court is required to presume prejudice unless it is shown 
that the denial was harmless. Prejudice is presumed because to require the requesting 
party to show that the error was harmful would place the requesting party in the untenable 
position of having to demonstrate that the contents of inaccessible information would have 
affected the outcome of the case. Because the requesting party does not have the 
information, he or she will never be able to demonstrate that the trial court's erroneous 
denial of a discovery request was anything but harmless. The burden of demonstrating 
that the erroneous denial of a discovery request was not prejudicial must therefore rest 
with the party resisting discovery. If the Appellant court cannot determine from the 
record whether the requested documents might have changed the outcome of the trial, the 
appellant court cannot say that the error was harmless, the appellant court will find that the 
trial court committed prejudicial error in denying the requesting party's discovery and the 
case can be remanded for a new trial. Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258, 1262-63 (Utah 
App. 1994) 
2. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact are legally insufficient in this case for 
the Trial Court to reach its Conclusions and Order to split the custody of the minor 
children, modifying the court's earlier award. 
3. The trial court erred in its Findings and Order of Split Custody in not 
considering the factors set forth in Rule 4-903 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Applicable Standard of Review. "When reviewing trial court determinations 
regarding the custody of children, we must do our own weighing and make our own 
decision based on the facts in the record. Nevertheless, the trial court is allowed a 
considerable latitude of discretion in child custody matters, and its judgment will not be 
disturbed unless we determine the trial court has exceeded the scope of permitted 
discretion or has acted contrary to law." In re KR. V. 906 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) 
As stated in Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 71 (Utah App. 1990); "...The 
trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to delineate what 
circumstances have changed and why these changes support the modification made in the 
prior divorce decree constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted and only support the judgment." In addition, "findings should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. Delirian. 737 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3): 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes 
or new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations 
for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10: 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or 
their marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order 
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for the future care and custody of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall consider the best 
interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards 
of each of the parties. The court may inquire of the children and take into 
consideration the children's desires regarding future custody or parent-time 
schedules, but the expressed desires are not controlling and the court may 
determine the children's custody or parent-time otherwise. Interviews may 
be conducted by the judge in camera only with the prior consent of the 
parties. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors 
the court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best 
interests of the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing 
contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the 
child, or has attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it 
shall take that evidence into consideration in determining whether to award 
custody to the other parent. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-903 
(3) Evaluators must consider and respond to each of the following 
factors: 
(A) the child's preference; 
(B) the benefit of keeping siblings together; 
(C) the relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of 
the prospective custodians; 
(D) the general interest in continuing previously determined 
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted; 
(E) factors relating to the prospective custodian's character or 
status or their capacity or willingness to function as parents, 
including: 
(i) moral character and emotional stability; 
(ii) duration and depth of desire for custody; 
(iii) ability to provide personal rather than surrogate 
care; 
(iv) significant impairment of ability to function as a 
parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking or other causes; 
(v) reasons for having relinquished custody in the past; 
(vi) religious compatibility with the child; 
(vii) kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances 
stepparent status; 
(viii) financial condition; and 
(ix) evidence of abuse of the subject child, another 
child, or spouse; and 
(F) any other factors deemed important by the evaluator, the 
parties, or the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a divorce matter, where the petitioner has filed a 
second Order to Show Cause in re contempt against the respondent post divorce for 
alleged violations of the Decree of Divorce and Judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings. The parties were divorced by the entry of a Decree of 
Divorce by the Honorable District Court Judge, Darwin C. Hansen, entered on the 20th day 
of October, 2000, following a trial held on the 1st day of August, 2000, with witnesses, 
including the parties and the court interviewed the minor children in chambers. 
Following the trial, the court awarded temporary joint custody of the children to the 
parties, with the respondent having physical custody of the two children, subject to 
petitioner's standard rights of visitation. A plan for parent and child counseling was also 
established and the Decree enjoined the respondent from manipulating the children so as 
to not further damage the petitioner's relationship with them. The respondent has filed a 
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Notice of Appeal as relates to the Decree of Divorce and Judgment, which is still pending 
before this court. 
The petitioner, before the entry of the Decree of Divorce, filed an Order to Show 
Cause in re contempt against the respondent. On October 6, 2000, a hearing was held on 
the petitioner's first Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt, alleging the respondent's 
noncompliance with the visitation, counseling and injunctive provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce. The trial court found the respondent in contempt of court with a sanction of 30 
days jail, 28 of which were suspended upon future compliance. 
The petitioner then filed a Second Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt against the 
respondent, which was heard on the 2nd and 3rd days of January, 2001, with the Trial 
Judge entering his own drafted Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on the 
22nd day of January, 2001. The respondent filed, Pro Se, a Notice of Appeal from the 
Order of January 22, 2001, on the 21st day of February, 2001. The Court of Appeals, filed 
a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition in this matter, which was briefed by the 
Respondent/Appellant and denied with the Respondent to file his Appellant Brief by the 
27th day of November, 2001. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court: The Trial Court, after making Findings of 
Fact following a hearing on the petitioner's Second Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt, 
held as follows: (1) the petitioner should be awarded the immediate sole care, custody, 
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and control of the minor child, Jared, and respondent, should be awarded the sole care, 
custody and control of Jacob, subject to modifications only upon the substantial change of 
circumstances; (2) the petitioner should be granted standard visitation rights with Jacob, 
and the respondent should be granted standard rights of visitation with Jared subject to 
certain exceptions set forth therein; (3) Dr. Swaner, who was not present for the ruling, 
should be requested to continue with counseling of the parties and their children regarding 
visitation; (4) The Guardian Ad Litem was requested to assist the petitioner with the 
change of custody of Jared and with future visitation of the boys with the petitioner and to 
coordinate that effort with Dr. Swaner if appropriate; (5) The Petitioner was awarded child 
support in the monthly amount of $164.00 based on a split custody worksheet; (6) The 
Respondent was ordered to submit all necessary income tax information to the tax preparer 
for amendment of the 1998 tax return on or before March 28,2001; (7) The Respondent 
was ordered to hold the petitioner harmless concerning the McDale Visa account; and (8) 
The court held that the respondent did knowingly fail to comply with the orders of this 
court since the October citation of Contempt and (9) The petitioner was awarded 
attorney's fees of $1,000.00. 
D. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review: 
1. The parties were divorced by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
a Decree of Divorce entered on the 20th day of October, 2000. The Decree of Divorce 
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was based upon a trial before the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen, sitting without a jury, held 
on the 1st day of August, 2001. A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce are included in the Appellant's Addendum. 
2. The Findings, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and Judgment 
were prepared by the petitioner's attorney. See attached documents. 
3. The Conclusions of Law in paragraph 3 state that it is in the best interests 
of the children to be together and given the present circumstances "Joint Temporary 
Custody is awarded." 
From this point forward custody could be modified without a change of 
circumstances. If it were a final order, a change of circumstances would be 
required. The Court is purposefully making it a temporary order. Temporary 
physical custody will be awarded to the Respondent. The terms and conditions of 
the custody situation are as follows: 
A. The Respondent shall have physical custody subject to the 
Petitioner having visitation as hereafter stated. 
B. Petitioner, Respondent and the children are to participate in 
counseling by a counselor who has not been involved to date with 
counseling either parent or the children. The parties are to agree on a 
qualified counselor^ preferably a licensed clinical psychologist. Nota a 
licensed clinical social worker. With a licensed clinical psychologist having 
expertise in children and adult emotional problems with the objective of 
assisting Respondent to cease his manipulation of the children against the 
Petitioner, to assist Petitioner and Respondent in their parenting skills, to 
assist the children in adjusting to the divorced and more important to help 
reestablish with regard to the children a positive Mother/Son 
relationship Counseling sessions maybe individually or together in 
whatever groups the counselor deems appropriate and as the counselor 
directs. The court will review the progress of counseling and whether each 
party and the children are progressing with regard to the objective above 
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mentioned. A review will be held in Court with the parties present without 
the children on Thursday, February 8, 2001, at 4:00 p.m 
See Addendum, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pages 8 and 9. 
4. Paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law states in 
regards to visitations 
as follows: 
4. Visitation: The children generally want to have contact with their 
Mother (Petitioner), Jared more than Jacob however, in the past both Boys have left 
visitation with Petitioner and walked to the Respondent's house some blocks away, 
without Petitioner's knowledge or consent. But with the approval of the 
Respondent, based upon those Findings the Court concludes with respect to 
visitation as follows: 
A. It is important that visitation by Petitioner occur without 
interference from the Respondent. That is to occur with the boys together 
unless the counselor recommends otherwise. Visitation shall occur as 
agreed between the parties, but in no event shall it be less than Standard 
Visitation as specified by the statute. During the period of family 
counseling, visitation may be altered as suggested by the counselor so as to 
enhance the success of achieving the counseling objectives as mentions 
earlier and specially and most importantly the re-establishment of the 
relationship between Mom (Petitioner) and her two (2) sons. 
5. Paragraph 30 of the Decree of Divorce and Judgment states as follows: 
30. Permanent Injunction: The Court permanently enjoins Respondent 
from disparaging, vilifying, demeaning or degrading the Petitioner in anyway, from 
manipulating the boys so as to further damage the parent child relationship with the 
Mother (Petitioner). If in fact there is a violation of this order, custody is 
temporary, and the Court reserves the right to change custody forthwith. The court 
is going to follow this case at least through February 2001. If there is any 
indication, that Respondent, during that period of time, is continuing to manipulate 
the minor children with the intent of destroying the Mother/Son relationship, the 
Court will take immediate steps to change custody/visitation. The reason why the 
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Court feels so keen about this, is because every young child has a right to love both 
parents. Every young child has the right to believe their Mom or Dad is the best 
person in the whole world and one side takes it upon himself or herself to 
intimidate and to try to weaken or destroy that relationship, it is unforgivable. The 
Court is convinced of one (1) thing and that is that the children need to be together. 
The thing that the Court is not convinced of is that, Respondent (Mr. Mackey), 
should have custody and therefore we have approximately six (6) months of 
counseling to see if the help of a counselor has changed the circumstances 
regarding the parties and their minor children. 
See Decree of Divorce and Judgment. 
6. On December 12, 2000, the respondent filed a Motion for Expanded time 
to prepare for the hearing so that discovery could be made, but the trial judge denied his 
Motion on the 15th day of December, 2000. The respondent made number requests to the 
petitioner and her attorney of record for a witness list and times agreeable for depositions, 
but no times were provided. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court erred in denying the respondent additional time under his 
Motion to Expand time for discovery and it is the burden of the petitioner, as the resisting 
party, to establish that this denial was not prejudicial error, which requires a remand of the 
case for a new trial allowing the respondent an opportunity to conduct his discovery as 
requested. 
II. The trial court's Findings of Fact are legally insufficient in this case for the 
trial court to reach its conclusions and Order in splitting the physical custody of the two 
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minor children in this case, modifying the trial court's earlier order of joint custody with 
the respondent to have physical custody of the two minor children because it was in the 
best interests of the two minor children to remain together and findings were not made in 
regard thereto in the trial judge reaching its ultimate conclusion to split custody. 
III. The trial court erred in its Finding and Order of split custody in not 
considering the factors set forth in Rule 4-903 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, when in its Findings and Decree of Divorce, the trial court spent pages of 
Findings in considering these same Factors in arriving at a joint custody award to the 
parties with the respondent to have the physical custody of the two minor children of the 
parties, such that the case should be remanded for further evidence and consideration of 
these factors first considered in the original order of custody. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE RESPONDENT 
MORE TIME UNDER THE RULES OF DISCOVERY. 
In preparation for the trial in this matter, the respondent attempted to obtain a 
witness list and deposition times from the petitioner and her attorney to no avail, in order 
to better prepare himself for the pending trial in this matter on the petitioner's Second 
Order to Show Cause in Re contempt. Eventually, as the respondent had no response 
from the petitioner's attorney as to these discovery requests, the respondent filed a Motion 
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with the court on the 12th day of December, 2000 for expanded time to prepare for the 
hearing so that discovery could be make by the respondent. The trial judge denied the 
respondent's motion on the 15th day of December, 2000. 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in particular, subsection (6), allows a 
party to a suit to "obtain discovery by one of more of the following methods: depositions 
upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of 
documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and 
other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admissions. 
The respondent attempted to set up depositions upon oral examination but got no 
response from the petitioner's attorney. The respondent attempted to obtain a witness list 
from the petitioner's attorney with no response from the petitioner's attorney. With this, 
the respondent filed a Motion with the trial judge, pro se, to obtain some relief and 
additional time in which to conduct discovery, some two to three weeks prior to the 
hearing on January 2 and 3 of 2001. This request for discovery was denied by the court 
and at the time of the trial, the respondent was surprised by one of the witnesses and again 
requested additional time and the respondent was told by the trial judge that he could 
interview the witness during the recess. 
The requested discovery was denied or at least the respondent was denied an 
opportunity to follow through on his discovery which was an erroneous denial by the trial 
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judge. This court held in Askey v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258, at 1262-63, in 1994, that if 
this court finds that the trial court has erroneously denied a discovery request of the 
moving party, then the appellant court is required to presume prejudice unless it is shown 
that the denial was harmless. But in the case of erroneously denied discovery, prejudice is 
presumed because to require the requesting party to show that the error was harmful would 
place the requesting party in the untenable position of having to demonstrate that the 
contents of inaccessible information would have affected the outcome of the case. 
Because the requesting party does not have the information, he or she will never be able to 
demonstrate that the trial court's erroneous denial of a discovery request was anything but 
harmless. According to this court, the burden of demonstrating that the erroneous denial 
of a discovery request was not prejudicial must therefore rest with the party resisting the 
requested discovery. If this burden cannot be shown by the resisting party then the matter 
should be remanded for a new trial as the denial of the discovery request is presumed 
prejudicial error. 
Accordingly, unless the petitioner can show that the denial of the respondent's 
request for additional time to conduct discovery, which was erroneously denied, is not 
prejudicial then the matter should be remanded for a new trial giving the respondent an 
opportunity to complete his discovery. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT IN THIS CASE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO REACH ITS 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER TO SPLIT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR 
CHILDREN, MODIFYING ITS EARLIER AWARD OF CUSTODY. 
The trial court, based on its findings and Order in the Decree of Divorce and 
Judgment, after a trial, ordered that based upon its Findings of Fact from the divorce trial, 
that "it was in the best interests of the children to be together." (Emphasis added) at 
page 7 of the Conclusions of Law. The trial court then went on to award to the parties 
joint temporary custody of the two minor children, with "temporary physical custody" 
(emphasis added) awarded to the respondent. This order was subject to change without a 
change of circumstances subject to counseling by the parties and the children through a 
new third party licensed clinical psychologist set forth on page 8 of the Conclusions of 
Law. 
After the entry of the Findings and Decree, the trial court set a review date of 
February 8, 2001, at 4:00 p.m. to review the matter. 
Thereafter, even before the Findings and Decree were signed the petitioner filed 
one and then an second Order to Show Cause in Re contempt. Both of these Orders were 
heard without a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. The trial court, in considering 
the petitioner's allegations of contempt against the respondent, then orders a change of the 
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joint and temporary physical custody and awards the petitioner one of the children and 
awards to the respondent the other child. 
A careful review of the trial Judge's Finding as set forth in pages 3-8 shows no 
consideration of the court's concern that the children should be together as stated in his 
Conclusions of Law on page 7 in reaching its Decree of Divorce. This was a primary 
concern of the trial court and was further mentioned in the final paragraph of the Decree 
of Divorce and Judgment on page 18, wherein the trial judge stated that it was convinced 
of one (1) thing and "that is that the children need to be together." There are no 
findings of the trial court in its findings or ruling in its Order on the Petitioner's Second 
Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt that the trial judge considered its earlier finding that 
the children should remain together from a hearing that was heard only five months 
earlier, at a time when the trial judge had spoken with the children in chambers after 
consent of the parties to the action. 
This court has held in Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 71 (Utah App. 1990) 
that the trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to delineate 
what circumstances have changed and why these changes support the modifications made 
in the prior divorce decree constitutes reversible error unless the facts are clear, 
uncontroverted and only support the judgment." This court further held that in addition, 
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"findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
The trial court did make factual findings as to the allegations of the petitioner 
against the respondent, but the trial court did not interview the minor children nor consider 
its earlier finding that the children should remain together and that this was in their best 
interests. If the trial court did consider this factor, which it found tantamount to its award 
of custody from the trial proceeding, then the trial court failed to sufficiently detail and 
include enough subsidiary facts or to delineate the steps by which the ultimate conclusion 
was reached on the factual issue in making an order to split the custodial arrangement of 
the minor children in this matter. 
Accordingly, the matter should be remanded either for a new trial or for the trial 
court to further consider its ultimate conclusion on its determination of custody of the two 
minor children as between these parties and the removal of one of the sons from the 
physical custody of the respondent/appellant. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING AND ORDER OF SPLIT 
CUSTODY IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACTORS SET FORTH IN RULE 4-903 OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
The trial judge in rending its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce and Judgment in the initial divorce proceeding rendered detailed Findings in 
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arriving at its conclusion that the respondent should be awarded the physical custody of 
the two minor children of the parties and that the children, as being in their best interests, 
should remain together with the respondent, at pages 2 through 5, paragraphs 4 through 
11. The trial court considered 3(D) in its original findings as set forth in Rule 4-903. 
The trial court considered 3(C)as to the relative strength of the parental bonds in its 
original findings as set forth in Rule 4-903. The trial court considered 3(E) in its original 
findings as set forth in Rule 4-903. The trial court considered 3(B) in its original findings 
as set forth in Rule 4-903. The trial court considered 3(E)(ii) in its original findings as set 
forth in Rule 4-903. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 
1982), that factors to be considered in making a custody evaluation in determining the best 
interests of the children consist of the preference of the child; keeping siblings together; 
the relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians; the 
general interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements where the child 
is happy and well adjusted; the prospective custodian's moral character and emotional 
stability, duration and depth of desire for custody; and his ability to provide personal 
rather than surrogate care; a significant impairment of the prospective custodian's ability 
to function as a parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking; or other cause, etc. All 
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the same essentially, as set forth in Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
In reviewing the trial court's findings on its Order splitting the custody of the minor 
child between the parties, few, if any, of the factors set forth in Rule 4-903 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration or the Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-10 were 
considered. 
The trial court seemed more interested in punishing the respondent in this 
subsequent hearing and finding him in contempt then in looking to the best interests of the 
children in splitting the custody of the minor children. 
Accordingly, this court should remand the matter for a new trial for consideration 
of the factors set forth in the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and the Utah Code 
Annotated Section 30-3-10 and for more detailed findings as to why the court split the 
custody of the minor children thereby modifying its first Order so that upon any further 
review, this court can review the steps taken by the trial court in reaching its ultimate 
conclusion as required in Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, infra. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of the respondent's Motion to Expand time for discovery is 
clearly erroneous and unless the petitioner can show the denial was not prejudicial the case 
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should be remanded for a new trial and an opportunity for the respondent to conduct his 
discovery. 
The trial court's findings are legally insufficient for a plenary review by this court 
as it failed to set forth a review of the requirements of Rule 4-903 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration and the Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-10, as it had done in 
its earlier decision on joint custody and it failed to delineate in detail its change in position 
held earlier that it was in the best interests of the minor children that they remain together 
in its order of split custody between the parties. 
DATED this 1*\ day of November, 2001. 
STEVEN R. BAILEY 
Attorney f6r)Respdi\dei 
Original Signatyre 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
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9 0 
STUWERT B. JOHNSON #6256 
Attorney for Petitioner 
3856 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
(801) 627-1110/328-1110 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY LEONA MACKEY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ROBERT KENNETH MACKEY. 
Respondent. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on August 1,2000 before the 
Honorable, Darwin C. Hansen. The Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by 
CounsetpSttiwert BrJohnson.-Respondent* Robert Mackey was present and was represented by 
Counsel, Steve Kaufman. From the records, files, and the testimony of the Petitioner, 
Respondent, and several witnesses, the Court being fully advised in the premises, now makes its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
WWPIWGSOFFACT 
I. Regard to Jurisdiction: Both parties were residents of Davis County as of the date 
the matterwas-fHed-and-had been for more than three (3) months immediately preceding. 
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2. Regard to Marriage: The parties were married March 12,1985 in Ogden, Weber 
County, State of Utah. 
3. Regard to Grounds: Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parting 
regarding the strength of their relationship and presently a difficulty with regarding with the 
parenting of the children. 
4. Respect to the Children: The Court finds regarding the children twnf?) children 
were born as issue of the marriage, to wit: JACOB MACKEY (DOB: 09/30/86) and JARED 
MACKEY (DOB: 09/22/92). 
5. Respect to the Need for Stability in the Custodial Environment: the Court makes 
the following Findings, there has not been stability in the lives o f the children since the separation 
of the parties of December 1998. 
A. The Respondent has filed three (3) abuse allegations against the Petitioner with 
the Davis County child protective services, all of which were found to be unsubstantiated In 
addition the most recent charge resulted in the custody of Jared being changed from the 
Petitioner to the Respondent, that existed for approximately six (6) weeks. 
B. The Respondent has involved both Children in the marital discord between the 
parties, by discussing the Petitioner's extramarital affair by verbally demeaning, bellied and 
disparaging the Petitioner, to the children, by verbally accusing the Petitioner of dishonesty, by 
involving the children in taking personal property for the Petitioner's residence and or 
investigating storage envies to see if property claimed by the Respondent, was stored there, all of 
which has caused an estrangement of the children from their Mother and by engaging in conduct 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Mackcyv. Mickey 
Case No.: 
Page 2 
designed to alienate the Mother/Son relationship rather than encouraging that relationship. 
C. In addition, the Petitioner's conduct concerning her extramarital affair and her 
own reasonable disciplinary measures of the youngest child has exacerbated that estrangement 
D. Both parents' conduct has caused the children to feel vulnerable and insecure 
resulting in both children acting out when they have been with their Mother, this acting out is 
mamfested by name calling, running from Mother's residence, running from school to Dad's home 
and vandalizing property at Mother's home. 
E. Such conduct has resulted in Petitioner calling the police due to Jacob's 
conduct 
6. Respect to Maintaining a Existing Primary Custodial Bond; At the time of the 
parties' separation the Parent/Child bond with both Parents was strong and secure. Since the 
separation the Parent/Child bond with the Respondent has increased while the bond with the 
Petitioner has dramatically decreased. The primary reason for the change, results from the 
Respondent's manipulative conduct by involving both children in the discord and to a lesser 
decree it has occurred by Petitioner's lack of judgment and her interaction with the children and 
her conduct regarding the extramarital affair. 
7. Respect to the Relative Strength nf the Parental Bonds; Both Parents feel a deep 
love and affection for their sons, the Respondeat however, has a tendency to discount the 
importance of maintaining a strong Mother/Son relationship thus, suggesting that his manipulative 
conduct is punitive and/or vindictive toward their Mother, due to her indiscretion, rather than the 
Respondent being supportive. In addition while the Mother loves her sons deeply, her conduct 
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does not appear that she is placing the children presently as her highest priority. 
8. With Respect to the Relative Abilities of the Parent? to Provide Care, 
Supervision and a Suitable Environment for the Children. Both parties are capable of 
providing adequate care and supervision of their sons, both have suitable homes for their custody. 
Both are employed and are able to provide for child care in their absence, but both lack basic 
parenting skills necessary to help the children adjust to the divorce in a fashion that is not 
destructive to the children. 
9. With Respect to the Benefits of the Keeping the Children Together The children 
want to stay together and the Court finds that it is in their best interest to stay together. They 
each receive support, security and love from the other, however, Jared is negatively influenced 
against his Mother by Jacob's strong negative attitude toward her. The Court finds that Jacob's 
attitude is primarily due to their Father's manipulation of the children during the custody battle of 
this case. Both children expressed a strong desire to be in the custody of their Father. 
10. With Respect to the Character and the Emotional Stability of the Parents: 
A. The Respondent is very emotional, he has threatened his life with suicide in 
order 4o achieve his goals, that is not to say that he is suicidal. Suicide has been threatened as 
part of his manipulation to achieve his objectives. Respondent is very manipulative and 
sometimes unreasonably assertive. Respondent has difficulty seeing other points of view or in 
seeing the effect his actions have on his Children. However, he is industrious and considered by 
his peers to be a person of good character. 
B. Petitioner likewise is considered by her peers as a person of good character and 
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is considered a good Mother. However, she has shown a lack ofjudgment during the custody 
litigation. 
C. Neither parent is religiously inclined. Past conduct of the parties indicates reliance on 
the supreme power. But organized religion has not been in the family's usual practice. 
11. With Respect to the Commitment of the Parents for Custody : Both parents 
deeply desire custody of their children. Respondent feels strongly that the boys should be 
together as does Petitioner, but she is willing to allow split custody as a current temporary order 
given the negative attitude of ho* son, Jacob. 
12. With Respect to Marital Property; The Courts makes the following findings: 
Nfaritai property includes that portion of the home in the sum of sixteen thousand two hundred 
dollars ($16,200.00) as indicated, the stock account of nine thousand dollars ($9000.00), the 
1990 Ford Bronco with the value of two thousand seven hundred fifty dollars ($2750.00), the 
1995 Buick Regal with the value of nine thousand four hundred dollars ($9400.00), the Motor 
Home is marital property, the Court finds it has no value given the current balance, the house 
trailer which is to be sold, the sale can be handled by the Respondent and all proceeds phis the 
costs of the sale divided between the parties, the boat of which the Court has given no value 
because the market value is less the money owing in effect is a loss, the utility trailer which the 
Court has given a value of one hundred dollars ($100.00Xhowever, it is agreed between counsd 
that this trailer was a pre-marital asset of the Respondent and the Respondent is to be given a 
$100.00 credit above the Court's final tabulation) and the deed Judgment which, if it is 
collectible, it should be divided equally, because the cost of the obtaining that Judgment came 
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firom marital funds. With respect to the personal property most of which is now divided the Court 
has not attempted to value that, there was no evidence presented to the Court with respect to 
that, but all of the property the Court would consider to be marital property. 
13. With Respect to Insurance and Retirement: The Court finds as follow^ the 
Respondent has health and accident insurance with the children through his place of employment 
The Respondent is to maintain that health and accident insurance. Any amount not covered by 
that policy, for health and accident, including dental, orthodontic, eye as well as regular health and 
accident is to be equally divided between the parties. The party providing the health insurance 
coverage on the minor children is to be given a credit for one-half of the cost of health coverage 
premium attributed to the minor children which is to be added or subtracted from the child 
support obligation. Day care costs for verified work related purposes are to be divided equally 
between the parties. 
With respect to retirement the Court concludes that the Petitioner, who has a civil service 
retirement and the Respondent who has a civil service retirement and a TSP investment that each 
of those are to be equally divided based upon the Woodward Formula and the period in question, 
would-be firom March 12,1985 the date of the marriage, to December 4,1998, the date of 
separation. 
14. With Respect to Debt and Obligations: The Court makes the following findings, 
the following debts exist and should be allocated as follows, 
A. First Mortgage; of the residence in the sum of forty five thousand seven 
hundred fifteen dollars ($45,715.00) that is the Petitioner's obligation. 
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B. Boat; with an approximate balance of twenty seven thousand dollars 
($27,000.00) that is the Respondent's obligation. 
C. Motor home; with a balance owing of approximately thirty seven thousand 
dollars ($37000.00) like wise the Respondent's obligation. 
D. Credit Cards: each will pay the credit in their own name. 
E. Debts since Separation; each will pay their own debts 
F. Future Shop/Camcorder the Respondent is obligated to pay that amount. 
COWCl^ SIONOFLAW 
1. Based upon those Findings of Fact this Court concludes that each party is entitled to a 
Decree of Divorce from the other based upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences and the 
Decree of Divorce is to become final immediately upon entry. 
2. The Court has Jurisdiction over the parties. 
3. It is in the best interest ofthe children to be together. Given the present drcumstances 
Joint Temporary Custody is awarded. From this point forward custody could be modified 
without a change of drcumstances. If it were a final order, a change of circumstances would be 
required. The Court is purposefully making it a temporary order. Temporary physical custody 
will be awarded to the Respondent. The terms and conditions ofthe custody situation are as 
follows: 
A. The Respondent shall have physical custody subject to the Petitioner having 
visitation as hereafter stated. 
B. Petitioner, Respondent and the children are to participate in counseling by a 
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counselor who has not been involved to date with counseling either parent or the children. The 
parties are to agree on a qualified counselor, preferably a licensed clinical psychologist. Not a 
licenced clinical social worker. With a licenced clinical psychologist having expertise in children 
and adult emotional problems with the objective of assisting Respondent to cease his 
manipulation of the children against the Petitioner, to assist Petitioner and Respondent in their 
parenting skills, to assist the children in adjusting to the divorce and most important to help 
reestablish with regard to the children a positive Mother/Son relationship. If the parties cannot 
agree on a counselor by August 10,2000, then each side will submit to the Court two (2) names 
which they recommend be appointed and these names are not to be any person who has been 
involved in counseling to date. There upon, the Court will appoint a counselor from those four 
(4) and advise the parties that counseling should begin immediately. Counseling sessions maybe 
individually or together in whatever groups the counselor deems appropriate and as the counselor 
directs. The Court will review the progress of counsding and whether each party and the children 
are progressing with regard to the objectives above mentioned. A review will be held in Court 
with the parties present without the children on Thursday, February 8,2001, at 4:00 p.m. A copy 
of the-Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and of the Decree of Divorce is to be given to the 
counselor with the request that the counselor provide the Court, with a written report of the 
progress of counsding within ten (10) days before the review and an interim report to the Court 
by November 30,2000. With respect to the payment, each party shall pay their respective 
individual counseling fees. With respect to the fees attributable to the children, Respondent will 
pay sixty three percent (63%) and the Petitioner will pay thirty seven percent (37%) of the 
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should be based upon the monthly gross figures the Petitioner is obligated to pay the Respondent 
child support given those figures. The Attorneys are to calculate that amount. The total income 
is eight thousand one hundred ninety six dollars ($8196.00) the Petitioner's share is thirty seven 
percent (37%), the amount of child support is based on two (2) children with income of eight 
thousand one hundred ninety six dollars ($8196.00), per month is one thousand two hundred fifty 
two dollars ($1252.00), thirty seven percent (37%) of that, is four hundred sixty four dollars and 
84 cents ($464.84) per month and that is what the child support is to be. Child support should 
begin September 1,2000, it should be paid one-half (V&) on the fifth (Sth) and one-half (Vi) on the 
twentieth (20th) of the month. If the Petitioner becomes thirty (30) days deliquent in the child 
support obligation, then the Respondent shall be entitled to a Withholding Order. 
6. Regarding Alimony: The parties have stipulated that alimony would be mutually 
waived by the each side and therefore the conclusion of law would be that no alimony shall be 
paid by either party to the other. 
7. Non-Marital Property: The following property is found to be non-marital, first (1st) 
the residence, Petitioner inherited the property, the residence of Sunset, from her grandparents, 
she received it in her name December 20,1990. While the parties lived in the home some three 
(3) weeks in 1985 they did not permanently occupy the premise until January of 1991. The 
current value of the property is eighty nine thousand dollars ($89,000.00), it was refinanced 
November 22,1995 and then had a value of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000.00). The home had 
a value in January 1991 based on extrapolation from the two (2) appraisals, therefore the non-
marital portion of the home equity is as follows: 
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A. In order to determine the non-marital portion of equity it is necessary to 
determine the marital portion of the equity in the home. The marital portion of the equity would 
be the current value eighty nine thousand dollars ($89,000.00) less (-) the value in January 1991, 
of seventy two thousand eight hundred dollars ($72,800.00), which is the sum of sixteen thousand 
two hundred dollars ($16,200.00) and the Court considers that to be marital property. The non-
marital property would be the current value of the home of eighty nine thousand dollars 
($89,000.00), less (-) the current mortgage of forty five thousand seven hundred fifteen dollars 
($45,715.00), less (-) the marital property of sixteen thousand two hundred dollars ($16,200.00) 
leaving a non-marital equity of twenty seven thousand eighty five dollars ($27,085.00). 
8. With Respect to Other Non-Marital Properties; (Specifically Inheritance) The 
Court Concludes as follows: the Petitioner received some seventy four thousand dollars 
($74,000.00) in inheritance. The balance at the time of separation was approximatdy twenty four 
thousand dollars ($24,000.00) of that figure nine thousand dollars ($9000.00) was co-mingled 
with marital funds in a stock account and therefore that nine thousand dollars ($9,000.00) given 
the co-mingling would be marital property. The balance however, of fifteen thousand 
($15,000.00) is non-marital property, though it may have been in an account with the 
Respondent's name on it, the court finds that it is non-marital and specifically finds that the 
Internal Revenue Service levied against that account for payment of delinquent taxes on the part 
of the Respondent in the amount of nine thousand six hundred twenty dollars ($9,620.00). But 
following investigation the IRS released the levy on those funds on January 13,1997, on grounds 
that the account was non-marital funds and therefore the Court concludes that the fifteen 
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thousand dollars ($15,000.00) or whatever amount is currently left is non-marital funds and not 
subject to distribution. 
9. Marital Property: The court makes distribution of marital property as follows: 
Residence $16200.00 Awarded to Petitioner 
Stock Account $9000.00 Awarded to Respondent, therefore 
that includes the six thousand dollars ($6000.00) Respondent put in his home for the down 
payment if there is any balance in that account it will go to Respondent. 
Ford Bronco $2750.00 Awarded to the Respondent 
Buick regal $9400.00 Awarded to the Petitioner 
Motor home Equity $0 Awarded to the Respondent 
Boat $0 Awarded to the Respondent 
Utility Trailer $100.00 Awarded to the Respondent 
House Trailer $ Is to be sold with VS going to each 
deed Judgment If collected V4 to each after 
subtracting the costs of collection 
Video-Camera $ Awarded to the Respondent 
The value in those two (2) columns, the Petitioner's portion of the marital equity is twenty 
five thousand six hundred dollars ($25,600.00) The Respondent's portion is eleven thousand 
seven hundred fifty dollars ($11,750.00) therefore there is to be a balancing factor, the 
Petitioner's assets should be reduced by six thousand nine hundred twenty five dollars ($6925.00) 
and the Respondent's increased by six thousand nine hundred twenty five dollars ($6925.00) 
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giving a total balance of eighteen thousand six hundred seventy five dollars ($18,675.00) on each 
side. The Court does not award the Respondent any lien in the Petitioner's home, however, the 
Court will tablature that the amount of the balancing factor is to be paid to the husband by the 
Petitioner within ninety (90) days ofthe entry of the Decree of Divorce, if not paid it will become 
a judgment in favor ofthe Respondent against the Petitioner. 
10. With Respect to the Distribution of Household Property; The Court concludes 
that all personal and household property currently in the possession of each party is confirmed to 
have been divided. However, with respect to Respondent's exhibit number one (1) that are pages 
one (1) through sixteen (16), the Court makes the following Conclusions; 
A. Regarding item one (1), items currently in Petitioner's possession are to be 
delivered to Respondent with the exception of David's bed, with respect to item two (2)pitems 
currently in Petitioner's possession are to be delivered to the Respondent with the exception of 
photographs. In all respects with respect with regard to photographs, if there are photographs 
which both parties want, the photographs in today's technology can be copied very simply. They 
are then to be copied and the cost of copying is to be equally divided and then split the 
photographs by each ofthe parties. With respect to item three (3) the Court concludes it is not 
applicable and with respect to item four (4) any items currently in Petitioner's possession has got 
to be delivered to the Respondent. If they are not in her possession she cannot deliver them. If 
she has them they are to be delivered and if she does not, there is nothing that the Court can do or 
willing to do with respect to that property. Now with respect to the hems five (5) through twenty 
four (24) the Court does not find that there is any need to make and order one way or the other. 
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With respect to thirty four (34), the Court concludes that the Petitioner may have the freezer and 
the keys. With respect to items thirty five (35) through forty two (42) again the Court concludes 
that no order is required or it has been accommodated in an another provision of these findings 
and conclusions. With respect to items forty three (43) through seventy seven (77) the Petitioner 
may keep those items with the exception of numbers fifty four(54) fifty five (55) fifty six (56), 
fifty seven (57), fifty nine (59), sixty (60), sixty two(62), sixty six(66), sixty seven(67), seventy 
five (75) and seventy seven (77) and those items are to be returned to the Respondent. With 
respect to that portion of the exhibit which is suggestive that the Petitioner may have those items, 
they are re-numbered one through one hundred and the Petitioner may have all of those items 
mentioned. 
11. With Respect to Retirement: The Court concludes that the Petitioner who has a 
civil sendee retirement and the Respondent who has a civil service retirement and a TSP 
investment that each of those are to be equally divided based upon the Woodward Formula and 
the period in question would be from March 12,1985 the date of the marriage to December 4, 
1998, the date of separation. 
12. Regarding the Boat and Motor Home: The Court concludes that the Petitioner's 
name is to be removed from those two (2) pieces of personal property within ninety (90) days 
from and after the entry of the decree of divorce and if Petitioner's name is not removed from 
those items within the ninety (90) days than each of those two (2) pieces of property are to be 
sold and after the sale any liability for any excess or deficiency remains with the Respondent. 
13. Miscellaneous Reimbursement: The Petitioner is ordered to reimburse Respondent 
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one-half (lA) of the America First Credit Union, Visa Card which was the balance as of 
November 5,1998. That is item number thirteen (13) on Respondent's exhibit one (1). The total 
amount is eight hundred three dollars ($803.00) one-half (14) would be four hundred two dollars 
($402.00). Respondent is ordered to reimburse the Petitioner as follows one-half (Vi) of the 
dental bills the total of winch is six hundred dollars ($600.00) therefore Respondent is to pay 
Petitioner, two hundred ninety nine dollars ($299.00) plus one-half Q/t) of the day-care incurred 
by the Petitioner since the date of separation, the total amount of which is three thousand four 
hundred forty nine dollars ($3449.00) one-half (!4) of which would be one thousand seven 
hundred twenty five dollars ($1725.00) therefore the Respondent is to pay the Petitioner two 
thousand twenty four dollars ($2024.00). Take the two thousand twenty four dollars ($2024.00), 
the Respondent is to pay the Petitioner, subtract four hundred two dollars ($402.00) that the 
Petitioner is to pay the Respondent, leaving a net amount of one thousand six hundred twenty two 
dollars ($1622.00) that the Respondent is to pay the Petitioner and an order that the one thousand 
six hundred twenty two dollars ($1622.00) be subtracted from the balancing factor associated 
with the distribution of the marital property. The balancing factor was six thousand nine hundred 
twenty five dollars ($6925.00) subtract from that one thousand six hundred twenty two dollars 
($1622.00) which the Respondent owes the Petitioner reducing that balancing factor to five 
thousand three hundred three dollars ($5303.00) which is to be paid by the Petitioner to the 
Respondent within the ninety (90) days. If not then a Judgment will entered. 
14. Internal Revenue Service Matters: The Court concludes that a there should he split 
exemptions between the two (2) sons, the Respondent may take the oldest child and Petitioner 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Madceyv.Mackey 
Case No.: 
Page 15 
may take the youngest and that is only so long as the Petitioner is current in child support 
payments at the end of any given taxable year. The Petitioner may take the youngest child so 
long as the child is eligible. When the oldest child reaches the age of majority or the point and 
time when no longer he can be taken as a tax exemption, Petitioner may still take the youngest. 
With respect to the 1998/1999 tax returns the Court did not hear much about the testimony about 
1999 but 1998 taxes were filed by the Petitioner and the Respondent has not paid his. The Court 
is going to order that the 1998 tax return be amended and that all deductions and obligations be 
united in the amended return and if that results into a refund than that refund shall be equitably 
divided. 
15. Attorneys Fees: Each party will pay their own Attorneys fees and costs. 
16. Cooperation: Each party is ordered to cooperate with respect to the implementation 
of the Conclusion of Law and of the Decree of Divorcee as required in order to adjust title and 
property and make distribution as indicated. 
17. Permanent Injunction: The Court permanently enjoins, Respondent from 
disparaging, vilify, demeaning or degrading the Petitioner in anyway, to manipulate the boys so is 
to further damage the parent child relationship with the Mother (Petitioner). If in fact there is a 
violation of this order, custody is temporary, and the Court reserves the right to change custody 
forthwith. The Court is going to follow this through February 2001, counseling is going to be an 
intricate part of what the Court wants to know and if it is succeeding. If there is any indication, 
that Respondent, during that period of time is continuing to manipulate the children, in the intent 
of destroying the Mother/Son relationship, the Court will change the custody arrangement. The 
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reason why the Court feds so keen about this* is because every young child has a right to love 
both parents. Every young child has the right to believe their Mom or Dad is the best person in 
the whole world and if one side takes it upon himsdf or herself to intinudate and to try to weaken 
or destroy that relationship, it is unforgivable and in this case the Court is convinced of one (1) 
thing and that is that the Children need to be together. The thing that the Court is not convinced 
of is that, Respondent (Mr. Mackey), should have custody and therefore we have approximately 
six (6) months of counseling to see if the hdp of a counselor has benefited the parties and the 
children. 
DATED this___day of ,2000. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE: 
Darwin C. Hansen 
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STUWERT B. JOHNSON #6256 
Attorney for Petitioner 
3856 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
(801) 627-1110/328-1110 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
PENNY LEONA MACKEY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ROBERT KENNETH MACKEY. 
Respondent. 
: DECREE OF DIVORCE AND JUDGMENT 
: Civil No.: 994700013 
: Judge:Darwin Hansen 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on August 1,2000 before the 
Honorable District Court Judge; Darwin C. Hansen presiding. Present in the Court was the 
Petitioner and was represented by Counsel, Stuwert B. Johnson. Respondent, Robert Mackey 
was present and was represented by Counsel, Steve Kaufinan. The Court having heard testimony 
of the parties, from various witnesses, and by stipulation of the parties spoke with the minor 
children in chambers and having received proffer of evidence and good cause appearing 
therefore, hereby makes and orders the follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AM> DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Regard to Jurisdiction: Both parties were residents of Davis County as of the date 
the matter was filed and had been for more than three (3) months immediately preceding. 
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2. Regard to Marriage: The parties were married March 12,1985 in Ogden, Weber 
County, State of Utah. 
3. Regard to Grounds: Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties 
regarding the strength of their relationship and presently a difficulty with regarding with the 
parenting of the children. 
4. Respect to the Children: Two(2) children were bom as issue of the marriage, to wit: 
JACOB MACKEY (DOB: 09/30/86) and JARED MACKEY (DOB: 09/22/92). 
5. Respect to the Need for Stability in the Custodial Environment: The Court found 
that there has not been stability in the lives of the children since the separation of December 1998. 
A. The Respondent has filed three (3) abuse allegations against the Petitioner with 
the Davis County child protective services, all of which were found to be unsubstantiated. In 
addition the most recent charge was resulted in the custody of Jared being changed from the 
Petitioner to the Respondent, that existed for approximately six (6) weeks. 
B. The Respondent has involved both children in the marital discord between the 
parties, by discussing the Petitioner's extramarital affair by verbally demeaning, bellied and 
disparaging the Petitioner, by verbally accusing the Petitioner of dishonesty, by involving the 
children in taking personal property from the Petitioner's residence and or investigating storage 
envies to see if property claimed by the Respondent, was stored there, all of which has caused an 
estrangement of the children from their Mother and by engaging in conduct designed to alienate 
the Mother/Son relationship rather than encouraging that relationship. 
C. In addition the Petitioner's conduct concerning her extramarital affair and her 
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own reasonable disciplinary measures of the youngest child has exacerbated that estrangement. 
D. Both parents conduct has caused the children to feel vulnerable and insecure 
resulting in both children acting out when they have been with their Mother, this acting out is 
manifested by name calling, running from Mother's residence, running from school to Dad's home 
and vandalizing property at Mother's home. 
E. Such conduct has resulted in Petitioner calling the police due to Jacob's 
conduct. 
6. Respect to Maintaining a Existing Primary Custodial Bond: The Court found that 
at the time of the parties' separation the Parent/Child bond with both Parents was strong and 
secure. Since the separation, the Parent/Child bond with the Respondent has increased while the 
bond with the Petitioner has dramatically decreased. The primary reason for the change, results 
from the Respondent's manipulative conduct by involving both children in the discord and to a 
lesser decree it has occurred by Petitioner's lack of judgment and her interaction with the children 
and her conduct regarding her extramarital affair. 
7. Respect to the Relative Strength of the Parental Bonds: The Court found that both 
Parents feel a deep love and affection for their sons, the Respondent however, has a tendency to 
discount the importance of maintaining a strong Mother/Son relationship thus, suggesting that his 
manipulative conduct is punitive and/or vindictive toward their Mother, due to her indiscretion, 
rather than the Respondent being supportive. In addition, while the Mother loves her sons deeply, 
her conduct does not appear that she is placing the children presently as her highest priority. 
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8. With Respect to the Relative Abilities of the Parents to Provide Care, 
Supervision and a Suitable Environment for the Children. The Court found that both parties 
are capable of providing adequate care and supervision of their Sons, both have suitable homes 
for their custody. Both are employed and are able to provide for child care in their absence, but 
both lack basic parenting skills necessary to help the children adjust to the divorce in a fashion 
that is not destructive to the children. 
9. With Respect to the Benefits of the Keeping the Children Together: The Court 
found that the Children want to stay together and the Court finds that it is in their best interest to 
stay together. They each receive support, security and love from the other, however, Jared is 
negatively influenced against his Mother by Jacob's strong negative attitude toward her. The 
Court finds that Jacob's attitude is primarily due his Father's manipulation of the children during 
the custody battle of this case. Both children expressed a strong desire to be in the custody of 
their Father. 
10. With Respect to the Character and the Emotional Stability of the Parents: 
A. The Respondent is very emotional, he has threatened his life with suicide in 
order to achieve his goals, that is not to say that he is suicidal. Suicide has been threatenedas 
part of his manipulation to achieve his objectives. Respondent is very manipulative and 
sometimes unreasonably assertive. Respondent has difficulty seeing other points of view or in 
seeing the effect his actions have on his children. However, he is industrious and considered by his 
peers to be a person of good character. 
B. Petitioner likewise is considered by her peers as a person of good character and 
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is considered a good Mother. However, she has shown a lack of judgment during the custody 
litigation. 
C. Neither parent is religiously inclined. Past conduct indicates a reliance on the supreme 
power. But organized religion has not been in the family's usual practice. 
11. With Respect to the Commitment of the Parents for Custody The Court found 
that both parents deeply desire custody of their children. Respondent feels strongly that the boys 
should be together as does Petitioner, but she is willing to allow split custody as a current 
temporary order given the negative attitude of her son, Jacob. 
12. With Respect to Marital Property: The Courts found that the marital property 
includes that portion of the home in the sum of sixteen thousand two hundred dollars 
($16,200.00) as indicated, the stock account of nine thousand dollars ($9000.00), the 1990 Ford 
Bronco with the value of two thousand seven hundred fifty dollars ($2750.00), the 1995 Buick 
Regal with the value of nine thousand four hundred dollars ($9400.00), the Motor home is marital 
property, the Court finds it has no value given the balance owing, the house trailer is to be sold 
and the sale may be handled by the Respondent, and all proceeds plus the costs of the sale divided 
between the parties, the boat of which the Court has given no value because the market value is 
less than the money owing, the utility trailer which the Court has given a value of one hundred 
dollars ($100.00), ( however, it is agreed between counsel that this trailer was a pre-marital asset 
of Respondent and Respondent is to be given a credit of $100.00 above the Court's final 
tabulation) and the Gleed Judgment which, if it is collectible it should be divided equally, because 
the cost of the obtaining that Judgment came from marital funds and with respect to the personal 
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property most of which is now divided the Court has not attempted to value that, there was no 
evidence presented to the Court with respect to that, but all of the property the Court considers 
to be marital property. 
13. With Respect to Insurance and Retirement: the Court found that the Respondent 
has health and accident insurance with the children through his place of employment. The 
Respondent is ordered to maintain that health and accident insurance on the minor children 
including coverage for dental, orthodontic, eye as well as regular health and accident. The party 
providing health coverage is to be given credit for one-half (14) of the health coverage premium 
attributable to the minor children with such amount to be added or subtracted from the child 
support obligation. Any medical, dental bills incurred on behalf of the minor children which are 
not covered by insurance are to be divided equally between the parties. The party receiving the 
medical bill shall present the invoice to the other party within 15 days of receiving such bill. In 
turn, the other party shall pay the medical bill within IS days from receiving it. Day care costs 
for verified work related purposes shall be split equally between the parties. 
With respect to retirement the Court concludes that the Petitioner, who has a civil service 
retirement and the Respondent who has a civil service retirement and a TSP investment that each 
of those are to be equally divided based upon the Woodward Formula and the period in question, 
would be from March 12, 1985 the date of the marriage, to December 4, 1998, the date of 
separation. 
14. With Respect to Debt and Obligations: The Court Orders that the following debts 
exist and should be allocated as follows, 
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A. First Mortgage; of the residence in the sum of forty five thousand seven 
hundred fifteen dollars ($45715.00) that is the Petitioner's obligation. 
B. Boat; with an approximate balance of twenty seven thousand dollars 
($27,000.00) that is the Respondent's obligation. 
C. Motor home; with a balance owing of approximately thirty seven thousand 
dollars ($37000.00) like wise the Respondent's obligation. 
D. Credit Cards: each will pay the credit in their own name. 
E. Debts since Separation; each will pay their own debts 
F. Future Shop/Camcorder: the Respondent is obligated to pay that amount. 
15. The Court Orders that it has Jurisdiction over the parties. 
16. The Court Orders that is in the best interest of the Children to be together. Given the 
present circumstances Joint Temporary Custody is awarded. It is ordered that custody could be 
modified without a change of circumstances. Temporary physical custody will be awarded to the 
Respondent, now the terms and conditions are as follows: 
A. The Respondent shall have temporary physical custody subject to the Petitioner 
having visitation as hereafter stated. 
B. Petitioner, Respondent and the children are to participate in counseling by a 
counselor who has not been involved to date with counseling either Parent or the children. The 
parties are to agree on a qualified counselor, preferably a licensed clinical psychologist. Not a 
licenced clinical social worker. With a licenced clinical psychologist having expertise in children 
and adult emotional problems with the objective of assisting Respondent to cease his 
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manipulation of the children against the Petitioner, to assist Petitioner and Respondent in their 
parenting skills, to assist the children in adjusting to the divorce and most important to help 
reestablish with regard to the children a positive Mother/Son relationship. If the parties cannot 
agree on a counselor by August 10, 2000. (which is nine (9) days from today) then each side will 
submit to the Court two (2) names which they recommend be appointed and these names are not 
to be any person who has been involved in counseling to date. There upon, the Court will appoint 
a counselor from those four (4) and advise the parties that counseling should begin immediately. 
Counseling sessions maybe individually or together in what ever groups the counselor deems 
appropriate and as the counselor directs. The Court will review the progress of counseling and 
whether each party and the children are progressing with regard to the objectives above 
mentioned. The review will be held in Court with the parties present without the children on 
Thursday, February 8, 2001, at 4:00 p.m. A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and of the Decree of Divorce is to be given to the counselor with the request that the counselor 
provide the Court, with a written report of the progress of counseling within ten (10) days before 
the review and an interim report to the Court by November 30,2000. With respect to the 
payment, each party shall pay their respective individual counseling fees. With respect to the fees 
attributable to the Children, Respondent will pay sixty three percent (63%) and the Petitioner will 
pay thirty seven percent (37%) of the counseling for the children. It is not equal, that percentage 
is the same percentage as child support. 
17. Visitation: The Court found that the children generally want to have contact with, 
their Mother (Petitioner), Jared more than Jacob however, in the past both boys have left 
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visitation with Petitioner and walked to the Respondent's house some blocks away, without 
Petitioner's knowledge or consent, but with the approval of the Respondent. Based upon those 
Findings the Court orders visitation as follows: 
A. It is important that visitation by Petitioner occur without interference from the 
Respondent. That is to occur with the boys together unless the counselor recommends otherwise. 
Visitation shall occur as agreed between the parties, but in no event shall it be less than Standard 
Visitation as specified by the statue. During the period of family counseling, visitation may be 
altered as suggested by the counselor so as to enhance the success of achieving the counseling 
objectives as mentioned earlier and specially and most importantly the re-establishment of the 
relationship between Mom (Petitioner) and her two (2) sons. 
18. With Respect to Income: The Court found that both parties are employees with the 
Civil Service or with the National Civil Service. The Petitioner working for the Internal Revenue 
Service and the Respondent being employed at Hill Air Force Base. The Petitioner's income is 
thirty six thousand five hundred nineteen dollars ($36,519.00) that equates to three thousand forty 
three dollars ($3043.00) per month gross. The Respondent's income is sixty one thousand eight 
hundred thirty six dollars ($61,836.00) per year, that equates to five thousand one hundred fifty 
three dollars ($5153.00) per month gross. Based upon the Findings the Court Orders that child 
support be based upon the monthly gross figures, the Petitioner is obligated to pay the 
Respondent child support given those figures. The total income is eight thousand one hundred 
ninety six dollars ($8196.00) the Petitioner's share is thirty seven percent (37%), the amount of 
child support is based on two (2) children with income of eight thousand one hundred ninety six 
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dollars ($8196.00), per month is one thousand two hundred fifty two dollars ($1252.00), thirty 
seven percent (37%) of that, thus, child support is set at the monthly amount of four hundred 
sixty four dollars and 84 cents ($464.84) . Child support is ordered to begin September 1, 2000, 
it should be paid one-half (Vi) on the fifth (5th) and one-half (14) on the twentieth (20th) of the 
month. If the Petitioner becomes thirty (30) days delinquent in the child support obligation, then 
the Respondent shall be entitled to a Withholding Order. 
19. Regarding Alimony: The Court found that the parties have stipulated that alimony 
would be mutually waived by the each side and therefore it is ordered that no alimony shall be 
paid by either party to the other. 
20. Non-Marital Property: The Court Orders the following property is found to be non-
marital, first (1st) the residence, Petitioner inherited the property, the residence of Sunset, from 
her Grand-Parents, she received it in her name December 20, 1990. While the parties lived in the 
home some three (3) weeks in 1985 they did not permanently occupy the premise until January of 
1991. The current value of the property is eighty nine thousand dollars ($89,000.00), it was 
refinanced November 22, 1995 and then had a value of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000.00). The 
home had a value in January 1991 based on extrapolation from the two (2) appraisals, therefore 
the non-marital portion of the home equity is as follows: 
A. In order to determine the non-marital portion of equity it is necessary to 
determine the marital portion of the equity in the home. The marital portion of the equity would 
be the current value eighty nine thousand dollars ($89,000.00) less (-) the value in January of . 
1991, of seventy two thousand eight hundred dollars ($72,800.00), which is the sum of sixteen 
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thousand two hundred dollars ($16,200.00) and the Court considers that to be marital property. 
The non-marital property would be the current value of the home of eighty nine thousand dollars 
($89000.00), less (-) the current mortgage of forty five thousand seven hundred fifteen dollars 
($45,715.00), less (-) the marital property of sixteen thousand two hundred dollars ($16,200.00) 
leaving a non-marital equity of twenty seven thousand eighty five dollars ($27,085.00). 
21. With Respect to Other Non-Marital Properties; rSpecifically Inheritance! The 
Court Orders that the Petitioner received some seventy four thousand dollars ($74,000.00) in 
inheritance. The balance at the time of separation was approximately twenty four thousand 
dollars ($24,000.00) of that figure nine thousand dollars ($9000.00) was co-mingled with marital 
funds in a stock account and therefore that nine thousand dollars ($9000.00) given the co-
mingling would be marital property. The balance however, of fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) is 
non-marital property, though it may have been in an account with the Respondent's name on it, 
the court finds that it is non-marital and specifically finds that the Internal Revenue Service levied 
against that account for payment of delinquent taxes on the part of the Respondent in the amount 
of nine thousand six hundred twenty dollars ($9620.00). But following investigation the IRS 
released the levy on those funds on January 13, 1997, on grounds that the account was non-
marital funds and therefore the Court concludes that the fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) or 
whatever amount is currently left is non-marital funds and not subject to distribution. 
22. Marital Property: The Court Orders that the parties make distribution of marital 
property as follows: 
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Residence $ 16200.00 Awarded to Petitioner 
Stock Account $9000.00 Awarded to Respondent, therefore 
that includes the six thousand dollars ($6000.00) Respondent put in his home for the down 
payment if there is any balance in that account it will go to Respondent. 
Ford Bronco $2750.00 Awarded to the Respondent 
Buick regal $9400.00 Awarded to the Petitioner 
Motor home Equity $0 Awarded to the Respondent 
Boat $0 Awarded to the Respondent 
Utility Trailer $100.00 Awarded to the Respondent 
House Trailer $ Is to be sold with !4 going to each 
Gleed Judgment If collected Vi to each after 
subtracting the costs of collection 
Video-Camera $ Awarded to the Respondent 
Given the value in those two (2) columns, the Petitioner's portion of the marital equity is twenty 
five thousand six hundred dollars ($25,600.00) The Respondent's portion is eleven thousand 
seven hundred fifty dollars ($11,750.00) therefore there is be a balancing factor, the Petitioner's 
assets should be reduced by six thousand nine hundred twenty five dollars ($6925.00) and the 
Respondent's increased by six thousand nine hundred twenty five dollars ($6925.00) giving a total 
balance of eighteen thousand six hundred seventy five dollars ($18,675.00) on each side. The 
Court does not award the Respondent any lien in the Petitioner's home, however, the Court will 
tablature that the amount of the balancing factor is to be paid to the husband by the Petitioner 
within ninety (90) days of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, if not paid it will become a 
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judgment in favor of the Respondent against the Petitioner. 
23. With Respect to the Distribution of Household Property: The Cnnrt Order* that 
all personal and household property currently in the possession of each party is awarded to that 
respective party. However, with respect to Respondent's exhibit number one (1) that are pages 
one (1) through sixteen (16), the Court make the following Conclusions; 
A. Regarding item one (1), items currently in Petitioner's possession are to be 
delivered to Respondent with the exception of David's bed, with respect to item two (2), items 
currently in Petitioner's possession are to be delivered to the Respondent with the exception of 
photographs. In all respects with respect with regard to photographs, if there are photographs 
which both parties want, the photographs in today's technology can be copied very simply. They 
are then to be copied and the cost of copying is to be equally divided and then split the 
photographs by each of the parties. With respect to item three (3) the Court concludes it is not 
applicable and with respect to item four (4) any items currently in Petitioner's possession has got 
to be delivered to the Respondent. If they are not in her possession she cannot deliver them. If 
she has them they are to be delivered and if she does not, there is nothing that the Court can do or 
willing to do with respect to that property. Now with respect to the items five (5) through twenty 
four (24) the Court does not find that there is any need to make and order one way or the other. 
With respect to thirty four (34) the Court concludes that the Petitioner may have the freezer and 
the keys. With respect to items thirty five (35) through forty two (42) again the Court concludes 
that no order is required or it has been accommodated in an another provision of these findings 
and conclusions. With respect to items forty three (43) through seventy seven (77) the Petitioner 
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may keep those items with the exception of numbers fifty four(54) fifty five (55) fifty six (56), 
fifty seven (57), fifty nine (59), sixty (60), sixty two(62), sixty six(66), sixty seven(67), seventy 
five (75) and seventy seven (77) and those items are to be returned to the Respondent. With 
respect to that portion of the exhibit which is suggestive that the Petitioner may have those items, 
they are re-numbered one through one hundred and the Petitioner may have all of those items 
mentioned. 
24. With Respect to Retirement: The Court Orders that the Petitioner's civil service 
retirement and the Respondent's civil service retirement and a TSP investment be equally divided 
based upon the Woodward Formula and the period in question would be from March 12,1985 
the date of the marriage to December 4,1998 the date of separation. 
25. Regarding the Boat and Motor Home: The Court Orders that the Petitioner's name 
be removed from those two (2) pieces of personal property within ninety (90) days from and after 
the entry of the decree of divorce and if Petitioner's name is not removed from those items within 
the ninety (90) days than each of those two (2) pieces of property are to be sold and after the sale 
any liability for any excess or deficiency remains with the Respondent. 
26. Miscellaneous Reimbursement: The Court Orders that the Petitioner is to reimburse 
Respondent one-half ( 14) of the America First Credit Union, Visa Card which was the balance as 
of November 5, 1998. That is item number thirteen (13) on Respondent's exhibit one (1). The 
total amount is eight hundred three dollars ($803.00) one-half (Vz) would be four hundred two 
dollars ($402.00). Respondent is ordered to reimburse the Petitioner as follows one-half (V4) of 
the dental bills the total of which is six hundred dollars ($600.00) therefore Respondent is to pay 
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Petitioner, two hundred ninety nine dollars ($299.00) plus one-half (Vi) of the day-care incurred 
by die Petitioner since the date of separation, the total amount of which is three thousand four 
hundred forty nine dollars ($3449.00) one-half ( V4) of which would be one thousand seven 
hundred twenty five dollars ($1725.00) therefore the Respondent is to pay the Petitioner two 
thousand twenty four dollars ($2024.00). Take the two thousand twenty four dollars ($2024.00), 
the Respondent is to pay the Petitioner subtract four hundred two dollars ($402.00) that the 
Petitioner is to pay the Respondent, leaving a net amount of one thousand six hundred twenty two 
dollars ($1622.00) that the Respondent is to pay the Petitioner and an order that the one thousand 
six hundred twenty two dollars ($1622.00) be subtracted from the balancing factor associated 
with the distribution of the marital property. The balancing factor was six thousand nine hundred 
twenty five dollars ($6925.00) subtract from that one thousand six hundred twenty two dollars 
($1622.00) which the Respondent owes the Petitioner reducing that balancing factor to five 
thousand three hundred three dollars ($5303.00) which is to be paid by the Petitioner to the 
Respondent within the ninety (90) days. If not then a Judgment will entered in favor of 
Respondent against Petitioner. 
27. Internal Revenue Service Matters: The Court Orders that a there should be split 
exemptions between the two (2) sons, the Respondent may take the oldest child and Petitioner 
may take the youngest and that is only so long as the Petitioner is current in child support 
payments at the end of any given taxable year. The Petitioner may take the youngest child so 
long as Respondent is eligible. When the oldest child reaches the age of majority or the point and 
time when no longer he can be taken as a tax exemption, Petitioner may still take the youngest. 
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With respect to the 1998/1999 tax returns the Court did not hear much about the testimony about 
1999 but 1998 taxes were filed by the Petitioner and the Respondent has not paid his. The Court 
orders that the 1998 tax return be amended and that all deductions and obligations be united in the 
amended return and if that results into a refund than that refund shall be equitably divided. 
28. Attorneys Fees: The Court Orders that each party pay their own Attorneys fees and 
costs. 
29. Cooperation: The Court Orders that each party is ordered to cooperate with respect 
to the implementation of the Conclusion of Law and of the Decree of Divorcee as required in 
order to adjust title and property and make distribution as indicated. 
30. Permanent Injunction: The Court permanently enjoins Respondent from 
disparaging, vilifying, demeaning or degrading the Petitioner in anyway, from manipulating the 
boys so is to further damage the parent child relationship with the Mother (Petitioner). If in fact 
there is a violation of this order, custody is temporary, and the Court reserves the right to change 
custody forthwith. The Court is going to follow this case at least through February 2001. If 
there is any indication, that Respondent, during that period of time, is continuing to manipulate 
the minor children with the intent of destroying the Mother/Son relationship, the Court will take 
immediate steps to change custody/visitation. The reason why the Court feels so keen about this, 
is because every young child has a right to love both parents. Every young child has the right to 
believe their Mom or Dad is the best person in the whole world and one side takes it upon himself 
or herself to intimidate and to try to weaken or destroy that relationship, it is unforgivable. The 
Court is convinced of one (1) thing and that is that the children need to be together. The thing 
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that the Court is not convinced of is that, Respondent (Mr. Mackey), should have custody and 
therefore we have approximately six (6) months of counseling to see if the help of a counselor has 
changed the circumstances regarding the parties and their minor children. 
DATED thi; iyo£l /??*- _2000. 
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DAVIS, UTAH - JANUARY 22, 2001 
HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. The 
matter before the Court this morning is Penny Mackey against 
Robert Kenneth Mackey. This is case #994700013. The matter 
was before the Court on January the 2nd and the 3rd of this 
year. We had a hearing on petitioner's second order to show 
cause in re: contempt. At the end of that hearing I took the 
matter under advisement, indicated to counsel and the parties 
that I would prepare the Court's findings of facts, conclusions 
of law and order. We set the matter for this morning for 
giving that order to the parties and it was set for eight 
o'clock. The record may reflect that Mrs. Mackey is present 
with her counsel as is Mr. Cathcart, the Guardian at Litem whom 
we invited to be here. 
And I appreciate your being here, Mr. Cathcart. 
The record should also reflect that my clerk phoned 
Dr. Swaner or at least his office and invited him to be here 
but he was out of town. A message was left to be given to him 
requesting that he be here this morning as well and I don't 
know if he got that message or not. 
1 
1 And I understand from my clerk commenting to me this 
2 morning that Mr. Cathcart, you have tried to get in touch with 
3 Mr. Mackey at his home and his office. Is that correct? 
4 MR. CATHCART: That's correct, Judge. I called both. 
5 I left a message at work. I did not leave a message at home 
6 but I called both numbers this morning and no response. 
7 THE COURT: All right. When you called at work was 
8 there any indication that he'd made arrangements not to be at 
9 work today, anything of that nature? 
10 MR. CATHCART: It was the same message that's on his 
11 machine each time I've called there so no difference. 
12 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. It is 
13 now past 8:15 and in deference to the parties, notwithstanding 
14 Mr. Mackey's non-appearance, I'm going to go forward and read 
15 the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the order. Then 
16 what I will do is get copies to Mrs. Mackey and to Mr. Johnson. 
17 I have a copy likewise for Mr. Cathcart, a copy for Mr. Mackey 
18 and also a copy for Dr. Swaner, I'm making three copies of a 
19 video of today's proceedings. One for Mr. Mackey and Mrs. 
20 Mackey and one for Dr. Swaner because I anticipated that he may 
21 not be here, given the circumstances. With that explanation 
22 then let me read these documents and then I will give to you 
23 the written document after I have read them for the record. 
24 The above entitled matter came on for trial on 
25 Tuesday and Wednesday, January 2nd and 3rd, 2001. Petitioner 
1 appeared with Counsel Stuwert B. Johnson. The respondent 
2 appeared without counsel. Based upon the evidence received at 
3 trial and upon the prior orders of the Court, the Court now 
4 makes and enters its findings of fact. 
5 One, Paragraph 16 and 17 of the Decree of Divorce 
6 gives temporary joint custody of the children to the parties 
7 with respondent having physical custody subject to petitioner 
8 having standard rights of visitation. A plan for parent and 
9 child counseling was also established. 
10 Two, Paragraph 30 of the Decree of Divorce enjoined 
11 respondent from manipulating the children so as to further 
12 damage petitioner's relationship with them. 
13 Three, on October 11, 2000, a hearing was held on 
14 petitioner's first Order to Show Cause in re: contempt, 
15 alleging noncompliance with the visitation, counseling and 
16 injunctive provisions of the Decree of Divorce, Page 2, 
17 Paragraph 2 of the order on Order to Show Cause confirms those 
18 allegations. Page 3 of that order sets forth a finding of 
19 contempt of court against respondent with the sanction of 30 
20 days jail, 28 of which were suspended upon future compliance. 
21 Four, the order on the Order to Show Cause provided 
22 for the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem, Page 6; that 
23 standard visitation in favor of petitioner was to continue, 
24 Page 2; and that respondent return the children to 
25 petitioner's home in the event they leave visitation earlier 
1 than specified, Page 7. 
2 Five, respondent has failed to comply with the terms 
3 of visitations since the October 11 hearing in the following 
4 particulars: (a) Full standard visitation has not been 
5 afforded petitioner during the months of October, November or 
6 December, 2000. The total visitation time petitioner's had 
7 with the children is October four hours forty minutes for 
8 Jacob, four hours forty minutes for Jared. November, six hours 
9 for Jacob, one half hour for Jared. December, eight hours for 
10 Jacob, eight hours for Jared. (b) Petitioner had no 
11 Thanksgiving visitation. Christmas was limited to only a few 
12 hours. There has been no overnight visitation since August 15. 
13 (c) Respondent has not cooperated with visitation in any good 
14 faith respect. He refuses to communicate with petitioner 
15 concerning visitation matters. He has never called or spoken 
16 to petitioner since October 11 to discuss why the children 
17 leave visitation early or to resolve questions about pickup 
18 time for visitations. He has never taken the children back to 
19 petitioner's home when they leave early nor initiated 
20 discussions with petitioner, either by telephone or in person 
21 regarding the problem. He claims that the petitioner seldom 
22 calls the children by telephone, however, petitioner testified 
23 that she calls nearly every day but those calls cannot get 
24 through nor can she leave messages. She has spoken to the 
25 children only once by telephone since October 11. Her 
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1 testimony is the more credible. (d) Respondent claims that 
2 Petitioner has failed to pickup the children at the appointed 
3 hour and that has been part of the reason for so little 
4 visitation. 
5 Petitioner on the other hand, testified that she 
6 timely goes to respondent's home to pickup the children but no 
7 one comes out of the house. She is unable to make contact with 
8 the respondent or with the children by telephone to inquire as 
9 to the situation. As a consequence, she is deprived of that 
10 day's visitation. Again, petitioner's testimony is the more 
11 credible. 
12 (e) Respondent's attitude toward visitation is 
13 passive at best and exacerbates the problem through non-
14 cooperation at worst. 
15 (6) Nothing in the record or through testimony 
16 suggests that the children's visitation with petitioner is in 
17 any way detrimental or harmful to them. 
18 (7) Paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce provides 
19 for the appointment of a counselor to provide therapy for the 
20 minor children to assist in visitation issues and to assist in 
21 the reestablishment of the mother/son relationship. Dr. Craig 
22 K. Swaner was appointed by stipulation of the parties. It was 
23 learned at the trial that Dr. Swaner is a personal friend of 
24 John Mackey who is respondent's brother. Dr. Swaner discussed 
25 this appointment with John Mackey and with respondent and with 
1 respondent's counsel but did not mention that relationship with 
2 petitioner or her Counsel. At the very least, there is an 
3 appearance of a conflict of interest on the part of Dr. Swaner 
4 and at the very worst, there is in fact a conflict of interest. 
5 Nevertheless, petitioner has made no motion to terminate Dr. 
6 Swaner's appointment by the court nor to discontinue his 
7 counseling. Dr. Swaner is not optimistic about successfully 
8 resolving the visitation problem or about improving the mother/ 
9 children relationship. 
10 (8) Paragraph 30 of the Decree of Divorce 
11 permanently enjoined respondent from further damaging the 
12 mother/child relationship. Respondent has failed to comply in 
13 this aspect as follows: (a) Through his non-cooperation with 
14 visitation, the mother/child relationship has significantly 
15 deteriorated since both the August and October hearings. (b) 
16 Respondent testified that the children are angry at their 
17 mother because she has possession of certain personal property 
18 awarded to him and to the children in the Decree of Divorce. 
19 Nevertheless, respondent has done nothing to assist with 
20 melioration of that problem by talking to petitioner about 
21 picking up the property which has been gathered by her and 
22 placed in the shed waiting for him to pick it up. Respondent's 
23 passivity on this point, adversely affects the children's 
24 attitude toward their mother; therefore, the Court has ordered 
25 respondent to pickup the property on Saturday, January 13, 2001 
1 at 2:00 P.M. (c) Respondent continues to involve both 
2 children in the details of the conflict emanating from the 
3 divorce. Dr. Swaner stated that the children blame the 
4 petitioner for the divorce, for the financial problems 
5 respondent is currently having, for the fact that the boat and 
6 the motor home have been repossessed, and for the fact that 
7 both Mother and Dad are no longer together. The Court 
8 specifically finds that this detailed information has been 
9 given to the children by respondent which has and continues to 
10 have a significant adverse affect on the mother/child 
11 relationship. (d) The Respondent has been uncooperative in 
12 the appointment of the Guardian Ad Litem which has impeded 
13 contact with the children by the Guardian Ad Litem. The Court 
14 granted an initial interview of the children by the Guardian Ad 
15 Litem at the beginning of the trial and stayed petitioner's 
16 payment of the money owed to respondent as specified in 
17 Paragraph 26 of the Decree of Divorce. The Court has 
18 authorized petitioner to use those funds to pay respondent's 
19 share of the Guardian Ad Litem costs. 
20 (9) Jacob's estrangement with his mother remains 
21 strong and adversely affects the mother/child relationship with 
22 Jared. When the children are with petitioner, Jared shows 
23 affection toward his mother but does not do so if in the 
24 presence of Jacob. Jared's relationship with his mother has 
25 deteriorated significantly since living with his father and 
1 brother. 
2 (10) The Temporary Order of Custody specified in 
3 Paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce is not working for 
4 reasons mentioned above. Permanent custody of both children 
5 should be fixed immediately with visitations specified and 
6 child support set, based on the gross income of the parties as 
7 established in Paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law, 
8 associated with the Decree of Divorce, namely, $36,519 for 
9 petitioner and $61,836 for respondent. 
10 (11) In Paragraph 27 of the Decree of Divorce, the 
11 parties were ordered to amend their 1998 IRS tax return and 
12 split any refund. Petitioner has given her tax information to 
13 the tax preparer but respondent has not. 
14 (12) In Paragraph 14e of the Decree of Divorce, each 
15 party was ordered to pay their own debts. The McDale Visa debt 
16 in the amount of $1,511.74 is solely respondent's obligation 
17 even though petitioner's name is on the card with respondent. 
18 Nevertheless, he has taken no steps to protect petitioner from 
19 the obligation. 
20 (13) Petitioner has incurred attorney's fees in the 
21 sum of $1,500 which the Court finds fair and reasonable. The 
22 petitioner is in need of assistance with payment of that 
23 obligation. She is in the process of refinancing her home in 
24 order to meet her financial obligations. Respondent earns 
25 sufficient income to assist Petitioner with that debt. 
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1 Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court 
2 now makes and enters Conclusions of Law, (1) Petitioner should 
3 be awarded the immediate sole care, custody, and control of 
4 Jared and respondent the sole care, custody, and control of 
5 Jacob subject to modification only upon the substantial change 
6 of circumstances. (2) Petitioner should be granted standard 
7 visitation rights with Jacob, Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-
8 35, 2000 Supplement - see copy attached - and respondent should 
9 be grsunted standard rights of visitation with Jared subject to 
10 the following exceptions: (a) Weekend visitation is to be 
11 alternated such that both boys are with petitioner on one 
12 weekend and both boys are with respondent the next weekend. 
13 The same alternating sequence is to apply to mid-week 
14 visitations. Pickup time for both parties, listen carefully, 
15 is 5:00 P.M. That's different than the four o'clock we talked 
16 about and that's for both sides. The rotation for weekend 
17 visitations shall begin with petitioner exercising visitations 
18 with Jacob on Friday, January 26, 2001; that's this Friday 
19 beginning at five P.M. and continuing to the following Sunday 
20 at seven P.M. 
21 (b) Holidays are allocated as follows: petitioner 
22 shall have both boys for those holidays set forth in Utah Code 
23 Annotated Section 30-3-35, Sub 2f, beginning in the year 2001 
24 and respondent shall have both boys for those holidays set 
25 forth in the same section, Sub 2g, beginning in the year 2001. 
1 Each year thereafter, the holidays specified in the two 
2 sections are to be reversed and shall alternate. 
3 (3) Dr. Swaner should be requested to continue with 
4 counseling of the parties and their children regarding 
5 visitation. He is to be especially sensitive that his efforts 
6 in that endeavor are objective and independent of any undue 
7 influence of either party or family members of either party. 
8 Moreover, coordination with the Guardian Ad Litem is to be 
9 established if appropriate. Monthly written evaluations are to 
10 be forwarded to the Court advising of the progress beginning 
11 with the month of January, 2001. 
12 (4) The Guardian Ad Litem should be requested to 
13 assist petitioner with the change of custody of Jared and with 
14 future visitation of the boys with their mother and to 
15 coordinate that effort with Dr. Swaner if appropriate. 
16 Petitioner may request the assistance of a police officer to 
17 accompany her to Respondent's residence to obtain Jared's 
18 clothing and personal belongings. 
19 Petitioner is further authorized to hold the funds 
20 payable to respondent as specified in Paragraph 26 of the 
21 Decree of Divorce in trust and use the same to pay respondent's 
22 share of the Guardian Ad Litem fee. Petitioner is to keep an 
23 accounting of those funds and any payments to the Guardian Ad 
24 Litem with a copy to respondent of all such payments as they 
25 are made. The balance if any is to be paid to the respondent 
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1 as such time as the Guardian Ad Litem appointment is 
2 terminated. 
3 (5) Petitioner should be awarded child support from 
4 respondent in the monthly amount of $164 beginning January 22, 
5 2001 which shall be payable thereafter on or before the 22nd of 
6 each month until Jared reaches majority or graduates from high 
7 school with his class, whichever is longer. See child support 
8 worksheet attached. 
9 (6) Respondent should be ordered to submit all 
10 necessary income tax information to the tax preparer for 
11 amendment of the 1998 tax return on or before March 28, 2001. 
12 (7) Respondent should be ordered to hold petitioner 
13 harmless concerning the McDale Visa account. 
14 (8) Respondent has knowingly failed to comply with 
15 the orders of this Court since the October Citation of 
16 Contempt, therefore, respondent should be ordered to serve 28 
17 days in the Davis County Jail on alternate weekends beginning 
18 Friday, January 26th, 2000 at 6:00 P.M. through the following 
19 Sunday at 6:00 and every other weekend thereafter as follows: 
20 February 9 thru 11 and 23 thru 25, March 9 thru 11 and 23 thru 
21 25, April 6 thru 8 and 20 thru 22, May 4 thru 6 and 18 thru 19, 
22 June 1 thru 3 and 15 thru 17, June 29 thru July 1 and July 13 
23 thru 14 and 30 thru 31, all in the year 2001. Parenthetically 
24 those dates are the weekends when Jacob will visit his mother. 
25 (9) Further hearings should be scheduled for 
11 
1 Tuesday, February 27, 2001 at 9:00 A.M. And let me call your 
2 attention to this, we initially set it for Monday the 26th. I 
3 have a conflict that day and so I moved it to the next day, 
4 Tuesday, February 27, 2001 at nine A.M. That hearing will be 
5 on petitioner's petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce and on 
6 respondent's Order to Show Cause in re: contempt. An in Court 
7 review hearing is scheduled for Thursday, March 29, 2001 at 
8 11:30 A.M. regarding counseling and visitation matters. 
9 Petitioner should be awarded judgment against respondent for 
10 attorney's fees in this matter in the sum of $1,000, dated the 
11 17th day of January, 2001, and I've signed the document. 
12 Now, attached to the findings and conclusions is the 
13 statute to which I made reference and also the worksheet for 
14 child support obligation based on split custody. In addition I 
15 have prepared an order on Petitioner's Second Order to Show 
16 Cause in re: Contempt. I won't read that order except to say 
17 that it tracks the conclusions of law verbatim with one 
18 exception and that is where each conclusion of law says 'should 
19 be', the word %is' has been inserted in the place of should be 
20 so that the order on Petitioner's Order to Show Cause in re: 
21 Contempt is declaratory and becomes then the order of the Court 
22 based upon the findings and conclusions. 
23 Let me make one other comment for the record. I 
24 dated this the 17th of January as I indicated. In the event 
25 respondent wishes to appeal, the time for filing of appeal is 
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1 30 days after the entry of the order. That would be the 17th of 
2 January. It's unfair to him if the 30 days begin to run as of 
3 that date where I set the matter for communication of the 
4 content of the order to him for today which is the 22nd of 
5 January. Therefore, if he were to make a request that the time 
6 for filing of appeal be extended five more days, I will grant 
7 that so that he is not at any disadvantage to appeal this 
8 matter if he wishes to do so. 
9 Having read now the findings of fact and conclusions 
10 of law and indicated the content of the order, let me inquire 
11 of you, Mr. Johnson, do you have any questions? 
12 MR. JOHNSON: I don't, Your Honor, other than on the 
13 issue of Dr. Swaner, we have prepared a motion to have him 
14 removed. I'm going to have to speak to my client regarding 
15 (inaudible) to try it one more time to see if he can help the 
16 ] children or not and the potential conflict. I want to explain 
17 to the Court, Your Honor, that the Court has not received that 
18 due to my workload because of a death I had in the family, I 
19 lost a week of work. 
20 THE COURT: In the event such a motion is filed, the 
21 Court would consider it then on its merits after I've had a 
22 response from Mr. Mackey. 
23 Anything further by way of questions? 
24 MR. JOHNSON: No Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Cathcart, do you have any questions? 
1 MR. CATHCART: Judge, I don't have any questions but 
2 I have a comment. On behalf of my clients, I understand what 
3 the Court's doing and I believe that's probably the appropriate 
4 course as we move on. My problem is, I have two very young 
5 children who are very angry. Jared, I think, there will be 
6 less trouble with your order. I think that might work and the 
7 separate will probably do as much as anything to facilitate 
8 that, so I think that's well taken. 
9 The one I have a real problem with is Jacob. I 
10 understand your order that says you will be with your mom from 
11 Friday night until Sunday night, Dad you help that, Guardian Ad 
12 Litem, you help that. Every weekend that he is suppose to have 
13 visitation, I have calls on my machine Monday morning. The 
14 police have been called almost without exception, every weekend 
15 and I am really concerned about that, not only that that won't 
16 happen but that the police get involved again and he is getting 
17 more and more into trouble and deeper and I don't know exactly 
18 how to handle that other than the fact to offer a little bit 
19 and then work him back in, but I'm very concerned about trying 
20 to force him to go from Friday to Sunday. I'm just not sure 
21 that's going to work. I don't disagree with what you're trying 
22 to do. I think that's the right step. I just don't know if I 
23 can implement that right now and I don't know if it's in my 
24 client's best interest to do so. 
25 THE COURT: Let me indicate to you, I recognize that 
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1 may be a problem. I am hopeful that Jared's transfer of 
2 custody can be effectuated forthwith. The best way to do that 
3 I have to leave up to you, Mr. Cathcart, as the Guardian Ad 
4 Litem and to the mother and to her lawyer. I was hopeful that 
5 Dr. Swaner would be here because I think that Jared and no 
6 doubt Jacob need to get counseling from him as soon as 
7 possible, if indeed he's in a position to do it. I have 
8 requested from Dr. Swaner monthly written reports. If you 
9 would like to give me such a report, I would appreciate that 
10 also and then we'll see what happens with connection with this 
11 matter. 
12 Mr. Mackey, you're forty minutes late. You are forty 
13 minutes late. 
14 MR. MACKEY: Yes sir, Your Honor. I apologize. 
15 THE COURT: Well, I don't accept it. Why were you 
16 not on time? 
17 MR. MACKEY: My son wouldn't leave to go to school 
18 today. He's afraid the police were going to come get him. 
19 THE COURT: Well, I have already indicated the 
20 Court's ruling. I've read it on the record and I don't know 
21 why I should read it again. I have copies of you. Mr. 
22 Cathcart was just responding to me about the order. 
23 Anything further, Mr. Cathcart? 
24 MR. CATHCART: No Judge. 
25 THE COURT: When you say your son, who were you 
15 
1 speaking of? 
2 MR. MACKEY: Jared. 
3 THE COURT: Well, I think it is important that yon 
4 hear the Court give you its findings and conclusions and so I 
5 will take the next twenty minutes and read them and then I will 
6 give you a copy. I will also give you a copy of the video 
7 because I trust that you would be requesting a copy. I've 
8 asked my clerk to make a copy accordingly. 
9 You will recall on the 3rd of January after we had the 
10 hearing, I took the matter under advisement and based upon that 
11 I indicated that I would prepare findings of fact, conclusions 
12 of law on Petitioner's Second Order to Show Cause in re: 
13 Contempt. I have done that and I will give you a copy but I 
14 want to read them to you before I give you a copy and I will do 
15 that for the record and I do that because I want you to listen 
16 as I go through carefully and if I give you the copy first, it 
17 may interfere with your listening as I go through each 
18 paragraph. 
19 The above entitled matter came on for trial on 
20 Tuesday and Wednesday January 2nd and 3rdf 2001. Petitioner 
21 appeared with Counsel Stuwert B. Johnson. Petitioner appeared 
22 without counsel - or respondent appeared without counsel. 
23 Based upon the evidence received at trial and upon the prior 
24 orders of the Court, the Court now makes and enters its ] 
25 findings of fact. One, Paragraph 16 and 17 of the Decree of 
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1 Divorce gives temporary joint custody of the children to the 
2 parties with respondent having physical custody subject to 
3 petitioner having standard rights of visitation. A plan for 
4 child and parent counseling was also established. 
5 Paragraph 30 of the Decree of Divorce enjoined 
6 respondent from manipulating the children so as to further 
7 damage the petitioner's relationship with them. 
8 Three, On October 11, 2000, a hearing was held on 
9 Petitioner's first order to show cause, in re: contempt 
10 alleging noncompliance with the visitation, counseling and 
11 injunctive provisions of the Decree of Divorce, Page 2, 
12 Paragraph 2 of the order on Order to Show Cause confirms those 
13 allegations. Page 3 of that order sets forth a finding of 
14 Contempt of Court against Respondent with the sanction of 30 
15 days jail, 28 of which were suspended upon future compliance. 
16 Four, the order on the Order to Show Cause provided 
17 for the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem, Page 6; that 
18 standard visitation in favor of petitioner was to continue, 
19 Page 2, and that respondent return the children to petitioner's 
20 home in the event they leave visitation earlier than specified, 
21 Page 7. 
22
 Five, respondent has failed to comply with the terms 
23 of visitations since the October 11 hearing in the following 
24 particulars: (a) Full standard visitation has not been 
25 afforded petitioner during the months of October, November or 
17 
1 December, 2000. The total visitation time petitioner's had 
2 with the children is October for Jacob, four hours forty 
3 minutes; Jared, four hours forty minutes. November; Jacob, 
4 six hours; Jared, one half hour. December for Jacob, eight 
5 hours; Jared eight hours. (b) Petitioner had no Thanksgiving 
6 visitation. Christmas was limited to only a few hours. There 
7 has been no overnight visitation since August 15. (c) 
8 Respondent has not cooperated with visitation in any good faith 
9 respect. He refuses to communicate with petitioner concerning 
10 visitation matters. He has never called or spoken to 
11 petitioner since October 11 to discuss why the children leave 
12 visitation early or to resolve questions about pickup time for 
13 visitations. He has never taken the children back to 
14 petitioner's home when they leave early nor initiated 
15 discussions with petitioner, either by telephone or in person 
16 regarding the problem. He claims that the petitioner seldom 
17 calls the children by telephone, however, petitioner testified 
18 that she calls nearly every day but those calls cannot get 
19 through nor can she leave messages. She has spoken to the 
20 children only once by telephone since October 11. Her 
21 testimony is the more credible. (d) Respondent claims that 
22 petitioner has failed to pickup the children at the appointed 
23 hour and that has been part of the reason for so little 
24 visitation. Petitioner on the other hand, testified that she 
25 timely goes to respondent's home to pickup the children but no 
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one comes out of the house. She is unable to make contact with 
respondent or with the children by telephone to inquire as to 
the situation. As a consequence, she is deprived of that day's 
visitation. Again, Petitioner's testimony is the more 
credible. (e) Respondent's attitude toward visitation is 
passive at best and exacerbates the problem through non-
cooperation at worst. 
(6) Nothing in the record or through testimony 
suggests that the children's visitation with petitioner is in 
any way detrimental or harmful to them. 
(7) Paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce provides 
for the appointment of a counselor to provide therapy for the 
minor children to assist in visitation issues and to assist in 
the reestablishment of the mother/son relationship. 
Dr. Craig K. Swaner was appointed by stipulation of 
the parties. It was learned at the trial that Dr. Swaner is a 
personal friend of John Mackey who is respondent's brother. 
Dr. Swaner discussed his appointment with John Mackey and with 
respondent and with respondent's counsel but did not mention 
that relationship with petitioner or her counsel. At the very 
least, there is an appearance of a conflict of interest on the 
part of Dr. Swaner and at the very worst, there is in fact a 
conflict of interest. Nevertheless, petitioner has made no 
motion to terminate Dr. Swaner's appointment by the Court nor 
to discontinue his counseling. Dr. Swaner is not optimistic 
1 about successfully resolving the visitation problem or about 
2 improving the mother/ children relationship. 
3 (8) Paragraph 30 of the Decree of Divorce 
4 permanently enjoined respondent from further damaging the 
5 mother/child relationship. Respondent has failed to comply in 
6 this aspect as follows: (a) Through his non-cooperation with 
7 visitation, the mother/child relationship has significantly 
8 deteriorated since both the August and October hearings. (b) 
9 Respondent testified that the children are angry at their 
10 mother because she has possession of certain personal property 
11 awarded to him and to the children in the Decree of Divorce. 
12 Nevertheless, respondent has done nothing to assist with 
13 amelioration of that problem by talking to respondent about 
14 picking up the property which has been gathered by her and 
15 placed in the shed waiting for him to pick it up. Respondent's 
16 passivity on this point, adversely affects the children's 
17 attitude toward their mother; therefore, the Court has ordered 
18 respondent to pickup the property on Saturday, January 13, 
19 2001. 
20 Was that done? Did you pick it up? 
21 MR. Mackey: No sir. 
22 THE COURT: (c) Respondent continues to involve both 
23 children in the details emanating from the divorce. Dr. Swaner 
24 stated that the children blame the petitioner for the divorce; 
25 for the financial problems respondent is currently having; for 
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1 the fact that the boat and motor home have been repossessed and 
2 for the fact that Mother and Dad are no longer together. The 
3 Court specifically finds that this detailed information has 
4 been given to the children by respondent which has and 
5 continues to have a significant adverse affect on the 
6 Mother/child relationship. (d) The respondent has been 
7 uncooperative in the appointment of the Guardian Ad Litem which 
8 has impeded the contact with the children by the Guardian Ad 
9 Litem. The Court granted an initial interview of the children 
10 by the Guardian Ad Litem at the beginning of the trial and 
11 stayed petitioner's payment of the money owed to respondent as 
12 specified in Paragraph 26 of the Decree of Divorce. The Court 
13 has authorized petitioner to use those funds to pay 
14 respondent's share of the Guardian Ad Litem costs. 
15 (9) Jacob's estrangement with his mother remains 
16 strong and adversely affects the mother/child relationship with 
17 Jared. When the children are with petitioner, Jared shows 
18 affection toward his mother but doefe not do so if in the 
19 presence of Jacob. Jared's relationship with his mother has 
20 deteriorated significantly since living with his father and 
21 brother. 
22
 I (10) The temporary order of joint custody specified 
in Paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce is not working for 
24 I reasons mentioned above. Permanent custody of both children 
25 J should be fixed immediately with visitations specified and 
21 
23 
1 child support set based on the gross income of the parties as 
2 established in Paragraph 5 of the conclusions of law associated 
3 with the Decree of Divorce, namely $36,519 for petitioner and 
4 $61,836 for respondent. 
5 (11) In Paragraph 26 of the Decree of Divorce, the 
6 parties were ordered to amend their 1998 IRS tax return and 
7 split any refund. Petitioner has given her tax information to 
8 the tax preparer but respondent has not. 
9 (12) In Paragraph 14e of the Decree of Divorce, each 
10 party was ordered to pay their own debts. The McDale Visa debt 
11 in the amount of $1,511.74 is solely respondent's obligation 
12 even though petitioner's name is on the card with respondent. 
13 Nevertheless, he has taken no steps to protect petitioner from 
14 the obligation. 
15 (13) Petitioner has incurred attorney's fees in the 
16 sum of $1,500 which the Court finds fair and reasonable. The 
17 petitioner is in need of assistance with payment of that 
18 obligation. She is in the process of refinancing her home in 
19 order to meet her financial obligations. Respondent earns 
20 sufficient income to assist petitioner with that debt. 
21 Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court 
22 now makes and enters conclusions of law, (1) Petitioner should 
23 be awarded the immediate sole care, custody, and control of 
24 Jared and respondent the sole care, custody, and control of 
25 Jacob subject to modification only upon a substantial change of 
22 
1 circumstances. 
2 (2) Petitioner should be granted standard visitation 
3 rights with Jacob based upon Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-
4 35 (2000 supplement) - see copy attached - and respondent 
5 should be granted standard rights of visitation with Jared 
6 subject to the following exceptions: (a) Weekend visitation 
7 is to be alternated such that both boys are with petitioner on 
8 one weekend and both boys are with respondent the next weekend. 
9 The same alternating sequence is to apply to mid-week 
10 visitations. The pickup time for both parties - listen 
11 carefully - is five P.M. for both of you. The rotation for 
12 weekend visitations shall begin with petitioner exercising 
13 visitation with Jacob on Friday, January 26, 2001 beginning at 
14 five P.M. and continuing through the following Sunday at seven 
15 P.M. (b) Holidays are allocated as follows: Petitioner shall 
16 have both boys for those holidays sets forth in Utah Code 
17 Annotated Section 30-3-25, Sub 2f beginning in the year 2001 
18 and respondent shall have both boys for those holidays set 
19 forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-35, Sub 2g beginning 
20 in the year 2001. Each year thereafter, the holidays specified 
21 in the two sections are to be reversed and shall alternate. 
22
 (3) Dr. Swaner should be requested to continue with 
23 counseling of the parties and their children regarding 
24 visitations. He is to be especially sensitive that his efforts 
25 in that endeavor are objective and independent of any undue 
23 
1 influence of either party or family members of either party. 
2 Moreover, coordination with the Guardian Ad Litem is to be 
3 established if appropriate. Monthly, written evaluations are 
4 I to be forwarded to the Court advising of the progress beginning 
5 with the month of January, 2001. 
6 (4) The Guardian Ad Litem should be requested to 
7 assist petitioner with the change of custody of Jared and with 
8 future visitations of the boys with their mother and to 
9 coordinate that effort with Dr. Swaner if appropriate. 
10 Petitioner may request the assistance of a police officer to 
11 accompany her to respondent's residence to obtain Jared's 
12 clothing and personal belongings. Petitioner is further 
13 authorized to hold the funds payable to respondent as specified 
14 in Paragraph 26 of the Decree of Divorce in trust and use the 
15 same to pay respondent's share of the Guardian Ad Litem's fee. 
16 Petitioner is to keep an accounting of those funds and any 
17 payments to the Guardian Ad Litem with a copy to respondent of 
18 all such payments as they are made. The balance, if any, is to 
19 be paid to the respondent at such time as the Guardian Ad Litem 
20 appointment is terminated. 
21 (5) Petitioner should be awarded child support from 
22 respondent in the monthly amount of $164 beginning January 22, 
23 2001 which shall be payable thereafter on or before the 22nd of 
24 each month until Jared reaches majority or graduates from high 
25 school with his class, whichever is longer. See child support 
24 
1 worksheet attached. 
2 1 (6) Respondent should be ordered to submit all 
3 necessary income tax information to the tax preparer for 
4 amendment of the 1998 tax return on or before March 28, 2001. 
5 (7) Respondent should be ordered to hold petitioner 
6 harmless concerning the McDale Visa account. 
7 (8) Respondent has knowingly failed to comply with 
8 the orders of this Court since the October citation of 
9 contempt. Therefore, respondent should be ordered to serve 28 
10 days in the Davis County Jail on alternate weekends beginning 
11 Friday, January 26, 2001 at six P.M. through the following 
12 Sunday at six P.M. and every other weekend thereafter as 
13 follows: February 9 thru 11 and 23 thru 25; March 9 thru 11 
14 and 23 thru 25; April 6 thru 8 and 20 thru 22; May 4 thru 6 
15 and 18 thru 19, June 1 thru 3 and. . . What I'm going to do is 
16 modify that somewhat by interlineation, it will be May 4 thru 6 
17 and 18 thru 20, June 1 thru 3 and 15 thru 17, June 29 thru July 
18 1 and July 13 thru 15 and 27 thru 29 and I will change that by 
19 J interlineation with respect to the copy filed in the Court. 
(9) Further hearing should be scheduled for Tuesday, 
21 I February 27, 2001 at nine A.M. on Petitioner's Petition to 
22 Modify the Decree of Divorce and on Respondent's Order to Show 
23 J Cause in re: Contempt. An in-court review hearing is 
scheduled for Thursday, Mary 29, 2001 at 11:30 A.M. regarding 
20 
24 
25 I counseling and visitation. 
25 
1 Mr. Mackey, the further hearing in this case, we set 
2 on the 3rd of January, we set it for February 26, that's a 
3 Monday. I have a conflict and cannot do it on Monday, so I've 
4 set it for Tuesday, February 27 at nine A.M., that's what's in 
5 these documents. 
6 (10) Petitioner should be awarded judgment against 
7 respondent for attorney's fees in this matter in the sum of 
8 $1,000. 
9 Now, I have also prepared Mr. Mackey, an order on 
10 Petitioner's Order to Show Cause in re: Contempt. I haven't 
11 read that order. It tracks the conclusions of law, in effect, 
12 verbatim with the exception that in each paragraph the phrase 
13 %should be' is replaced by the term %is' or %shall' so that the 
14 order on the Petitioner's Order to Show Cause becomes 
15 declaratory rather than just simply indicating that's what 
16 ought to be. Now what I will do is give you a copy of the 
17 findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the order. I signed 
18 these documents the 17th of January. You may wish to appeal 
19 this. You've filed appeals in other aspects of this case. You 
20 have 30 days from today in which to appeal it or you're likely 
21 waiving your right to an appeal. And when I say 30 days from 
22 today, normally you have 30 days from the date the matter is 
23 filed and entered, that was January 17 but I'm going to give 
24 you 30 days from today to appeal so that you are not prejudiced 
25 by having less than 30 days. That would not be appropriate. 
1 So if you wish to file an appeal you may do so but it must be 
2 filed within 30 days of today. Do you understand that, sir? 
3 MR. MACKEY: Yes sir. 
4 THE COURT: Do you have any questions? 
5 MR. MACKEY: No sir. 
6 THE COURT: Now I'm going to file a commitment to the 
7 Davis County Jail today. I will give you a copy and you are to 
8 appear at six P.M. this Friday and every other week thereafter 
9 and serve your 28 days, Friday through Sunday. Do you 
10 understand that? 
11 MR. MACKEY: Yes sir. 
12 THE COURT: And the visitation with respect to Jacob 
13 will be on the weekend you're in jail. Do you have any 
14 questions about that at all? 
15 MR. MACKEY: No sir. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Now, Jared's transfer to his 
17 mother by way of sole custody is to occur immediately and it 
18 seems to me that what I ought to do is suggest that the 
19 Guardian Ad Litem and you, Mr. Mackey, and Mr. Johnson confer. 
20 Let me take a recess. I'm going to order you Mr. Mackey not to 
21 leave the courtroom. After you folks have talked about this 
22 matter, let me know and I'll come back on the bench and we'll 
23 make a record of how the transfer of Jared is to take place. 
24 That's after the discussion between you Mr. Mackey, Mr. 
25 Cathcart and Mr. Johnson and it ought to take place in such a 
1 fashion that it's least traumatic for Jared. It ought to occur 
2 where Jared can receive counseling as soon as possible from Dr. 
3 Swaner and also talk with his lawyer about the matter. 
4 Now with respect to Jacob and Jacob's visitation, if 
5 there is a stipulation between Mother and Dad and when I say 
6 that I'm talking about through Mr. Johnson, and the Guardian Ad 
7 Litem with respect to the weekend visitations, you can advise 
8 the Court of that also when we return after you have that 
9 discussion. Anything further? 
10 MR. MACKEY: I'm not sure what you just eluded to. 
11 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Cathcart is aware of it and he 
12 can talk to you about it. Let me give to you then a copy -
13 MR. CATHCART: Your Honor, can I ask you one more 
14 thing? 
15 THE COURT: Surely. 
16 MR. CATHCART: One other concern I have, this is 
17 going to cause turmoil, I suggest, between everybody and the 
18 children. The one thing I'm really concerned about is going to 
19 notch up all of the tension is that if the boys are told in an 
20 inappropriate manner at least that Mr. Mackey is going to serve 
21 more jail. I'm very concerned about that. My opinion would be 
22 or my request to the Court is that only the therapist be 
23 allowed to tell them that in the way that he deems appropriate 
24 even if he deems it appropriate. Otherwise both parties be 
25 restricted and attorneys, everyone until the therapist thinks 
it's right. I think that is one thing that has caused a huge 
amount of trouble in our case already was just that weekend 
that Mr. Mackey spent and I'm really concerned that if Mr. 
Mackey or Ms. Mackey tells the children in whatever manner they 
tell them, that that's going to cause further problems, so I'd 
ask they be restrained from doing that. 
THE COURT: It may and I am going to enter a 
restraining order against both of you. You are not to tell the 
children about the jail, Mr. Mackey. 
MR. MACKEY: My concern is, sir, this weekend is 
awful close, I mean — 
THE COURT: You're not going to change my order. 
MR. MACKEY: I'd like to get Jacob and Jared into 
counseling before this weekend. 
THE COURT: You would like to get Jacob into 
counseling. 
MR. MACKEY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Mother will get Jared into counseling. 
Custody has transferred. Do you understand? 
MR. Mackey: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me go a step further. 
Mr. Mackey, I've been involved in this case now for 
quite a while. I've had to hold you in contempt twice and the 
reason I have done so is because without doubt you have been 
manipulating these children to the disadvantage of the 
1 mother/son relationship. Sir, I will not have it and in 
2 connection with your going to jail, it was justified then, it's 
3 justified now. If I learn in an Order to Show Cause based upon 
4 a full hearing, you are continuing in your conduct, I will find 
5 you in contempt a third time. I will impose an additional jail 
6 time. It will be consecutive with what I have already set 
7 forth now and it will not be on weekends, it will be during a 
8 sustained period of time notwithstanding the influence it may 
9 have on your job and I hope you believe what I'm telling you. 
10 These boys, as I told you before, have the right to 
11 have respect for both parents. When one parent damages that 
12 respect on the part of the boys with the other, this Court 
13 simply will not stand for it, and that occurred after your 
14 first marriage with children you had then and reference has 
15 been made to affidavits that I received and was made a part of 
16 the record in connection with the first trial, and Mr. Mackey, 
17 it must stop because if it doesn't, consequences are sure to 
18 follow. Do you understand? 
19 MR. MACKEY: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Do you understand my 
21 restraining order that you have no discussion with either of 
22 your sons that you're going to spend more time in jail? 
23 MR. MACKEY: Yes sir. I 
24 THE COURT: And do you, Mrs. Mackey? 
25 MS. MACKEY: Yes sir. 
1 THE COURT: And do you understand the consequence if 
2 disobey that order? 
3 MR. MACKEY: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: Anything further? 
5 MR. CATHCART: No Judge, thank you. 
6 MR. MACKEY: Your Honor, the meeting with me and Mr. 
7 Johnson and attorney Cathcart, will that be in here privately? 
8 THE COURT: Yeah. It needs to be private. 
9 MR. Mackey: I didn't know about the other people. 
10 THE COURT: It needs to be private. When I say 
11 you're not to leave the courtroom, really what I intend to say 
12 is that you are not to leave the courthouse. There's a room if 
13 you go outside these double doors, turn to the right, there's a 
14 conference room out there. You and Mr. Cathcart and Mr. 
15 Johnson can go there and talk privately and after you have done 
16 that and you have come to an agreement, then we'll come back on 
17 the record and you can indicate to me what the agreement is and 
18 we'll go from there. 
19 Now, what I'm going to do is give, well, I won't give 
20 you copies of these just yet. I'm going to make the 
21 interlineation change on each one of them and then when we 
22 reconvene, I'll give you all copies with the interlineated 
23 change marked so there's no question and no confusion. 
24 The Court will be in recess. 
25 (Whereupon a recess was taken) 
1 THE COURT: The record may reflect that both parties 
2 are here; Mr. Johnson and Mr. Cathcart. 
3 And have you had a chance now to discuss the issues 
4 that I raised? 
5 MR. CATHCART: We have, Judge. We've done a couple 
6 of things I want to tell you about. The first thing is as far 
7 as the exchange, the parities have agreed that they will 
8 exchange Jared for custody purposes this afternoon at six P.M. 
9 That give Mr. Mackey time to get home from work, get Jared's 
10 things together. We talked the best way to do that. What 
11 they're going to do is tell Jared that he can take whatever 
12 toys and clothes he has that he wants to to his mom's house. 
13 If that becomes a problem I'm going to have her call me and 
14 then I'll try to work on some other items that we thing we need 
15 to have exchanged. But evidently there's some at each house 
16 and we're trying to let Jared have as much a say in that as we 
17 can. 
18 I've asked Mr. Mackey and he's agreed to be as 
19 supportive as he can, to speak well of this plan even though he 
20 doesn't agree with it and I told him I'm not sure I agree with 
21 it yet. We're going to try this and we get going but we all 
22 have to support it if we're going to make this as easy on the 
23 boys as we can and so he's agreed to do that and try and help 
24 facilitate this exchange although it will be difficult I'm 
25 sure. He's also — 
1 THE COURT: Is it -
2 MR. CATHCART: I'm sorry, Judge? 
3 THE COURT: Is it necessary for a police officer to 
4 be there? 
5 MR. CATHCART: Judge, you know, I have a hard time 
6 with that except that that's the only way to have a third party 
7 there to just be a witness if nothing else to make sure things 
8 don't go wrong. I know Mr. Mackey said that at one time Jared 
9 had to be handcuffed to go to his mother's. I don't want him 
10 handcuffed to make a change of custody and I know that wasn't 
11 your purpose but that was what I heard and I'm really against 
12 that. If it gets that serious then we need to do something 
13 else. I don't want their little boy handcuffed. 
14 THE COURT: The order said "may", it doesn't say 
15 "shall". So I'm simply asking the question, is it necessary? 
16 Yes or no in that regard? 
17 MR. CATHCART: I think it's necessary to have someone 
18 there during the exchange, yes. 
19 THE COURT: Can you agree on who that ought to be? 
20 MR. CATHCART: The officer? 
21 THE COURT: No no. If it's a third party, should it 
22 be a police officer? 
23 MR. CATHCART: Oh I see. 
24 THE COURT: Or should it be someone else? 
25 MR. CATHCART: I don't know, Judge. We didn't talk 
1 about it so I don't know. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
3 MR. CATHCART: The other thing is, I've asked Mr. 
4 Mackey, as I spoke to him, you were reading your findings and 
5 he didn't have a chance to explain and I think both parties 
6 agree that January 13, when you asked him to pick up the 
7 property, because of the holiday weekend, the kids were also 
8 with Ms. Mackey and you said, Don't pick up the property when 
9 the boys are there so he did call Ms. Mackey, left a message, 
10 said I can't pick the property up because the boys are there. 
11 We need to reschedule it. Now, I've encouraged them to 
12 reschedule it and he's going to pick up that property this 
13 Thursday the 25th at five P.M. and they both agree that's an 
14 appropriate time and that works and doesn't interfere with 
15 visitations because I want to get that out of the way. I think 
16 that will help with the boys if I can say, hey, your folks have 
17 exchanged the property, you guys quit worrying about it now 
18 because that was a big issue with them when I talked to them. 
19 So we're trying to facilitate that and get that done and that 
20 will help also. 
21 I've set appointments to meet with both parties. I'm 
22 also going to have them bring in the boys. I may go to the 
23 house and talk to Jared though to Ms. Mackey's house to talk to 
24 Jared because he's a little easier to control, I think, in his 
25 own environment. And then I'll have Mr. Mackey bring in Jacob 
1 also. Sof anyway, those are the things that we've set so far 
2 that I remember anyway. I think that's everything, isn't it? 
3 MR. JOHNSON: It is, Your Honor, with a couple of 
4 items, Your Honor, that may have been overlooked. With the 
5 pickup this Thursday at five P.M., going back to when one child 
6 is with the respondent and one child is with the petitioners we 
7 had that mid-week visitation, one was Wednesday, one was 
8 Thursday, and to avoid prolonging the transfer of property can 
9 we just have it understood that's what the Court going to go 
10 back to in the mid-week. I understand the weekends but on the 
11 mid-week we just not have the boys around and they can be with 
12 other relatives so we can get this property transferred. 
13 THE COURT: I have no objection to that. My only 
14 comment is, when we were in court before, both parties agreed 
15 to pick up the property on that Sunday. 
16 MS. MACKEY: We didn't realize it was a holiday 
17 weekend. 
18 THE COURT: And that's why it was put in the order. 
19 So we can modify that and get it picked up Thursday or 
20 Wednesday or whenever you can agree, it just needs to get done 
21 and two people need to talk to each other in a civil way to get 
22 it done. 
23 MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I'll have my client again 
24 have all the property available Thursday at five. 
25 Your Honor, with the transfer of Jared, it becomes a 
1 question on what's best for him and less traumatic on him. I 
2 proposed to Terry that perhaps Jared's items should be made or 
3 made available before he gets out of school today and Mr. 
4 Mackey wanted him, the boy, to pick and choose the items that 
5 he was going to take to Penny's. So we agreed that at six 
6 o'clock, given the fact that the Guardian Ad Litem indicated 
7 that the boy should hear from his father in a positive way 
8 where he's going to go live for right now. It probably would 
9 be best to have a third party there, Your Honor, and I hate to 
10 impose upon Terry but that's who we would suggest. He's there 
11 for the boys, not for one side or the other. I don't think 
12 he's viewed as being as hostile as they may view a police 
13 pfficer. Other than that Your Honor, I don't know of any other 
14 third party that could be there that wouldn't choose sides. 
15 THE COURT: Is that possible, Mr. Cathcart? 
16 MR. CATHCART: I have a mediation. I've got to see 
17 what time it starts. It starts at 1:30. Routinely they go 
18 three to four hours. I don't know. I'm going to be pressed. 
19 I could maybe do it. I guess I could just cut the mediation 
20 short if I needed to. I'm not... I don't see my role... I try 
21 to take that on in these things and I'm not sure is a 
22 peacemaker between the two parties and I'm not sure I want to 
23 get into that role. I try to facilitate this and help and 
24 hopefully and I know I've pushed on Bob pretty hard in a couple 
25 of things. He's not represented by counsel and I don't take 
1 advantage of him but I'm trying to help smooth things out. I'm 
2 not sure that on an exchange of property, I don't know, I guess 
3 I represent the child, it would be appropriate but I don't 
4 know. I'll leave it up to you. If you want me to do it I'll 
5 do it. If you... 
6 THE COURT: Frankly in my judgment - well, look, 
7 before I give you my judgment, let me inquire, Mr. Mackey, do 
8 you have any objection if Mr. Cathcart fills that role? 
9 MR. MACKEY: Not at all Your Honor. I'd prefer it 
10 that way. 
11 THE COURT: You know, I recognize that there has been 
12 problems with police officers before and I put in the order the 
13 police officer because frankly as I look at the circumstance 
14 between these two people, it has deteriorated to the point that 
15 sometimes someone with authority may have to be there but 
16 there's a downside to having a police officer there and I look 
17 at that down side not from the standpoint of either parent but 
18 from the standpoint of the kids. 
19 And I also recognize, Mr. Cathcart, that it does go a 
20 little bit beyond what typically would be the role of a 
21 Guardian Ad Litem but in this case where you do represent the 
22 boys, they do need, I think, someone independent there to help 
23 them and if you would be willing to facilitate that this 
24 afternoon, the Court would be appreciative. 
25 MR. CATHCART: I can, Judge. 
1 THE COURT: All right. And that's set for - what time 
2 is that set for? 
3 MR. CATHCART: Six o'clock, Judge. 
4 THE COURT: All right and is that agreeable with both 
5 sides? 
6 MR. JOHNSON: It is. Your Honor. 
7 MR. MACKEY: Yes, sir. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. CATHCART: Judge, may I tell you one other thing 
10 just so its in the open? 
11 THE COURT: Yes, please to. 
12 MR. CATHCART: I didn't tell Ms. Mackey because she 
IS wasn't there, I'm very serious about them talking to the boys 
14 about the jail time and those sorts of things, leaving the 
15 papers lay around where the boys can read them and I told them 
16 I will not hesitate one bit to bring an Order to Show Cause for 
17 Contempt on behalf of my clients if they do that and so that 
18 kind of goes to this afternoon, you know. If I see problems, 
19 I'm not going to hesitate to bring something before the Court 
20 in the form of a Request for Sanctions or Contempt because 
21 something has to happen here and if I have to facilitate it, 
22 I'm okay to do that, and so I want to be forward with you, 
23 Judge, and I told Mr. Mackey that and he understands and I told 
24 Stu, so that he could tell his client so I just want them to 
25 hear that. That's what I intend to do if there's a problem. 
1
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1 THE COURT: And frankly from the Court's point of 
2 view, that's what I would expect you to do and I hope that both 
3 sides understand that if such a motion is filed and I have a 
4 hearing and conclude that, in fact, there's been a violation of 
5 my orders, folks, I will impose sanctions on either side. This 
6 situation has got to stop with these two boys because I'll tell 
7 you what is happening. It's so destructive to have continue 
8 what's been going on with these two boys that they're probably 
9 better off with a third party and without either parent, if it 
10 isn't brought under control and stopped. 
11 And Mr. Mackey I believe that there is, looking at 
12 the whole history of this, an overt effort on your part to 
13 contribute to, if not to aggravate and cause further 
14 deterioration and destruction of the mother/child relationship 
15 and I'm just here to tell you it's got to stop. 
16 Now, I want to raise another issue that I asked you 
17 to talk about and that's visitation with Jacob. Have you 
18 discussed that? 
19 MR. CATHCART: We didn't talk about it too much, 
20 Judge, because we kind of got wrapped up in these other things, 
21 so no we haven't. I intend to talk to both parties. You know, 
22 it's this weekend. Mr. Mackey's request is that the boys at 
23 least get to see Craig Swaner and talk to him, you know, Dr. 
24 Swaner before the visitation if we can work that if at all 
25 possible. 
1 THE COURT: I would suggest that you try to get in 
2 touch with Dr. Swaner on the telephone and talk to him and try 
3 to get the boys up to see him if not today, tomorrow. 
4 MR. CATHCART: Okay. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Anything further? 
6 MR. CATHCART: I think that's all I have, Judge. 
7 THE COURT: Let me just ask the bailiff to give a 
8 copy of these papers which have been, they have been 
9 interlineated. 
10 Give this to Mr. Mackey please. Give this to Mrs. 
11 Mackey. Give this to Mr. Johnson. Give this to Mr. Cathcart. 
12 This goes to Dr. Swaner. 
13 Now, again maybe I could get input from counsel 
14 and/or the parties. This needs to get to Dr. Swaner today if 
15 possible. Can that be done through counsel or if I put it in 
16 the mail he's not going to get it until tomorrow or the next 
17 day? 
18 MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, my client took the whole 
19 day off today and she's indicated she would drop that off to 
20 Dr. Swaner's office and she needs to make an appointment for 
21 her and Jared anyway. 
22 THE COURT: This goes to Dr. Swaner. I have three 
23 videos, a copy for Mr. Johnson and for Ms. Mackey, a copy for 
24 Mr. Mackey, and a copy for Dr. Swaner and so I'll give you two 
25 of those copies, Mr. Johnson, and your client can deliver not 
1 only the pleadings but also that video to Dr. Swaner for his 
2 review, and a copy to Mr. Mackey so he will have it. 
3 All right. Anything further, counsel? 
4 MR. JOHNSON: No, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Mackey? 
6 MR. MACKEY: Yes, Your Honor. After the hearing last 
7 time when I went out the door I tried to leave and there was 
8 people from the petitioner's side that were right in the way. 
9 I tried to go out the other way and found out that was a fire 
10 exit, came back, had some verbal things said at me and I didn't 
11 appreciate it. I'd just like to be able to leave today without 
12 being verbally, a confrontation outside. 
13 THE COURT: Let me make a comment. All I can say is 
14 I hope that that doesn't happen. You know, you've got a family 
15 here from both sides. Emotion is high. My concern in this 
16 case, really, is for the children, not for Mom and Dad. It's 
17 inappropriate for the family on either side to make comments by 
18 way of sarcasms, snide remarks, comments that imply we one 
19 upped you this time. Those kind of comments are inappropriate 
20 and they do not contribute to a resolution of the problem. 
21 They magnify the problem. 
22 And I am hopeful that those who are involved whether 
23 they're in the court or outside the court, would exercise 
24 civility, maturity, good judgment and sensitivity to two 
25 children and be guided by that contemplation and evaluation. I 
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MR. JOHNSON: No, Your Honor. 
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Court i s in recess . 
h e r e u p o n the proceedings were concluded., 
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m THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY LEONAMACKEY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ROBERT KENNETH MACKEY 
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CAUSE IN RE CONTEMPT 
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The above entitled matter came on for trial on Tuesday and Wednesday, January 2*1 and 
3*, 2001. Petitioner appeared with counsel Stuwcrt B.Johnson. Respondent appeared without 
counsel Based upon the evidence received at trial and upon the prior orders of the Court, the 
Court now makes and enters: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Paragraph 16 and 17 of the Decree ofDivorccghfestemporaryjcn^ custody of the 
chOdren to the parties with Respondent havirg physical aistody subject to 
Peb^onerhavnigstandanlri^itsofvish^tion. A plan for parent and child 
counseling was also established. 
2. Paragra]rii 30 of the Decree ofDivorceenjohtedReso^^ 
the children so as to further damage Pethlooer'srelatbnsmpwimtliem. 
3- On October 11,2000, a hearing was held on Petitioner's 1st Orderto Show Cause 
in re Contempt alleghujnorHxmipBance wife the v & ^ 
injmieliveprDvisfonscffa Page 2, paragraph 2 of the Order 
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on Order to Show Cause confirms those allegations. Page 3 of that Order sett 
forth a finding of Contempt of Court against Respondent wife a sanction of 30 
days jail, 28 of winch were suspended upon future compliance. 
The Order on the Order to Show Cause provided for the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem (page 6), that statuiardvisitatiemm favor ofTetitioner was to 
continue (page 2); and that Respondent xetiim the ctf 
the event they leave visitation earner than specified (page 7). 
Respondent has failed to comply with the tems ofvisitation since the October 
ll^heazsuimthefoUowingpardculars: 
A. Full standard visitation has not bom aflfonied Petitioner during me 
mon^t f October, November or Decen&er, 2000. The total 
time Petitioner has had with the children is: 
Jacob lared 
Oct 4hra-40mm 4hrs-40 nun 
Nov. 6 hours Vihour 
Dee Shorn 8 hours 
B. PetitiojicrhadiK>Thank^^ Cba^tamBWuiBal^to 
only a few hours. There has been iwovenughtVa^^ 
August 15* 
C Respondent has rotco^^ 
reject He refuses to ccuaimim^ 
witation matters. HehasnevercaUedor^ 
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Oct l l*to discuss wi^the children leave visitatioD early or to 
resolve questions about picfc^ time for visitation. He has never 
taken the children bade to Petitioner's home when they leave early 
nor initiated discussions with Petitioner, either by tdephone or in 
person, regarding the problem. He dahm thai Petmcmer seldom 
calls the children by telephone. However, Petitioner testified that 
she calls nearly every day but those calls cannot get through nor can 
die leave messages. She has spoken to the children only once by 
telephone since October 11*. Her testimony is the more credAle. 
D. Respondent c l a i m s ^ Petitioner Imf^ed top 
at the appointed hour and that has been part ofthe reason for so 
fittle visitation. Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that she 
timely goes to Respondem's home to 
one comes out ofthe house. She is unabk to make contact with 
Respondent or with die children by tdcpl«oiie to inquire as to the 
situation; as a consequence, she is dq>rived of that day's visitati 
Again, Petitioner's testimony is the more credible. 
B. Respondent's attitude toward visitation is passive at best and 
exaceri>ates the problem tiiroug^ 
Nothing in the record or t i r ^ ^ 
with Petitioner is in any way detrimental or harmful to them. 
Paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce provides for the appointment of a 
-3-
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problem by talking to Petitioner about pidrii^ up the property 
which has been gathered by her and placed in a shed waiting for him 
to pick it up. Respondent's passivity on this point adversely a&ecta 
the children's attitiide toward their mother. Therefore, the Court 
has ordered Respondent to pick lip the property on Saturday, 
January 13,2001 at2PM. 
Respondent continues to involve both children in the detaib of the 
conflict emanating from the divorce. Dr. Swaner stated that the 
children blame the Petitioner for the divoiro, for the financial 
problems Respondent is currently having, for the feet that the boat 
and motor home hove been repossessed, and for the feet that 
mother and dad are no longer together. Tie Court specifically finds 
that this detafled information has been given to the children by 
Respondent, which lws and continues to h ^ 
affect on the mother-child relationship. 
The Respondent has been uncooperative m die appointment of the 
guardian ad litem (GAL) which has impeded contact with the 
children by the GAL. The Court granted an initial interview of the 
children by the GAL at the begumingofthe trial and stayed 
Petitioner's payment of the money owed to Respondent as specified 
in paragraph 26 of the Decree of Divorce. The Court has 
authorized Petitioner to use those funds to pay Responded 
-5-
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of the GAL costs. 
9. Jacob's estrangement with Us mother janaiiis stfong and adverady affects the 
mother-child rdationship with Jared When the children are with Petitioner, Jared 
shows auction toward his mother but does wrt do so tfm the presence of Jacob, 
lared's fdationsha; whli nis nwther has d 
ha father and brother. 
10. TheTeomoraiyOKkYofJoimCus^ 
Divorce knot working fbr reasons mentioned above. Permanent custody of both 
children should be fined immediately with visiiaiionspecinWanddBldsi^portset 
based on the gross income of the parties as established in paragraphs of the 
Conclusions oFLaw associated with the Decree crfDtvorce,to-wfc $36,519 for 
Peritioner and $61,836 fin: Respondent. 
11. fa paragraph 27 oftne Decree ofDivon^ the parties were Ordend 
1998 IRS tax return and spfit any refiand Petitioner has given her tax information 
to tiie tax preparer but Respondent has not 
12. In paragraph 14 E of the DecwctfDrvc*ce,eacft 
own debts. The MeDul Visa debt to the anioum of $1,511.74 is solely 
Respondent's obligation, even though Petitioner's name is on the card with 
Respondent Nevertheless, he has taken no steps to pnnectPetiiku^ 
obligation. 
13. Petitioner has incurred atton^fi^m the swn of $1^00.00 wMcA the Coint finds 
fair and reasonable. The Petitioner is miieed of assistance w& 
-6-
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that obligation. She win Ac process of refingwang her home in order to meet her 
financial obfigatfom Re^ondem earn* juffiderthicome to assist Pctitkmeri^ 
that debt. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court HOW makes and eaten: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner should be awarded die immediate sob c ^ 
Jared, and Respondents 
modification o n t y q ^ 
2. Petitioner shoidd be granted 
Annotated § 30-3-35 [2000 Supplement] - see copy attached) and Respondent 
should be granted standard rights of visitation with Jared, subject to the following 
exceptional 
A. Weekend visitation is to be alternated such that both boys are with 
Petitioner on one weekend and both boys are with Re^Kmdem the next 
weekend. The same alternating sequence is to apply to mid-week 
visitation. Pick-up time for both parties is 5 PM. The rotation for 
weekend visitation shall begin withPctitioner exercising visitation with 
Jacob on Friday January 26,2001 b ^ 
through the Mowing Sunday at 7 F M 
B. Holidays are allocated as follows: Petirionershafl have both boys for those 
holidays set forth is UCA § 30-3-35 (2X9 beginning in the year 2001 and 
Respondent shall have both boys for those holidays set forth in UCA §30-
-T. 
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3J5(2Xg) beginning in the year 2001. Each year thereafter the holidays 
jggrifiejjji the two srctiom are4frbe rffrmwl am! shall ft*™HHfTr 
3. Dr. Swaner should be requested to coiidmic with counseling ofthc parties and 
their children regarding visitation Hektobee^eciallysefl^velliathiseflfortsm 
that endeavor are objective and indcspemiefltofaiy undue iirfhience of d t h e r p ^ 
or fiutaly members of cither pertf Moreover, coordination with the GAL is to be 
established, if appropriate. Monthly written evaluations am to be forwarded to the 
Court advising of the progress begraungwiththenionthof Jwuaiy, 2001. 
4 The GAL should be requested to a s ^ 
Jared and with, future visitation of the boys with their mother and to coordinate 
thai effort with Dr. Swaner, if appropriate. Petitioner may request the assistance 
of a police officer to accompany her to Respondent's residence to obtain Jared's 
dothing and personal belongings. Petitioner is fiirther authorized to hold the fimds 
payable to Respondent as specified in jmiagrapfa 26 ofthe Decree of Divorce in 
trust and use the same to pay Respondent's share ofthe GAL fee. Petitioner is to 
keep an accounting of those funds and aiy payments to the GAL with a copy to 
Respondent of all such payments as they are made. The balance, if any, is to be 
paid to the Respondent at such time as the GAL appointment is terminated. 
5. Petitioner should be awarded child support from Respondent m the monthly 
amount of $164 beginning January 22,2001 which shall be payable thereafter on 
or before the 22* of each month until Jared reaches majority or graduates from 
hi^sdwol with his cJass. whichever is longer. (See chiM support worksheet 
•8-
attached). 
Respondent should be ordered to submit ad necessary income tax information to 
the tax preparer for amendment of the 1998 tax return on or before March 28, 
2001. 
Respondent should be ordered to hold Petitioner harmless eoocermng the McDill 
Visa account. 
Respondent has knowingly feiled to comply wMitiie Orders ofthis Court since the 
October citation of contempt Therefore, Respondent should be ordered to serve 
28 days in the Davis County Jail on alternate weeleeitdsbeguimiujFikiay, January 
26,2000 at 6 PM through the followmg Sunday at 6 PM and eveiy otLq weekend 
thereafter as follows. February 9-11 & 23-25; March 9-11 & 23-25; April 6-8 & 
20-22; May 4-6 & 18-8; June 1-3 A15-17; Tune 29-July 1; July 13-X& 30*f, 
all in the year 2001. 
Further bearing should be scheduled for Ibesday, February 27,2001 at 9 AM on 
Petitioner's Petition to modify the Decree aiidDirorceaiKi on Respondent's Order 
to Show Cause in re Contempt. An in-Court review hearing is scheduled for 
Thursday, March 29,2001 at 1130 AM reganfagcounselmgatHi visitation 
matters. 
Petitioner should be awarded judgment agaiiatResporident for a t to t^ 
matter in the sum of $1,000. 
-9-
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DATED this / / d a y of January, 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
^4 
DAR3HIBX. HANSEN 
District Court Judge 
.10. 
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30*3-33. Advisory guidelines. 
tfOTSS TO DECISIONS 
Day care. the aoecuitodjal parent unfit to pttnride wdi 
Subjection (13) does not entitle • noncnste- servicer it has the discretion to deny the aon-
dial parent to provide day care, but only enff- custodial patent's request to provide day ear*, 
geste chat the crlol court encourage each an Child* * CbiWs, 967 R2d 942 (Utah Ce. App. 
arrangement. 50 that when the trial court fbds 1998), cere, denied. 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 19991. 
30-3-35. Minimmn schedule for visitation for children 5 to 
18 years of age. 
(1) The visitation schedule in this section a 
age. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule the following schedule 
shall be considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent 
and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) (i) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent 
or the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 pjn^ or 
(ii) at the election of tiie noncustodial parent, one weekday from the 
time the child's school is regularly dismissed until 8;30 pm., unless 
ihe court directs the application of Subsection (2XaXi); 
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the 
entry of the decree from 6 p JOB. on Friday until 7 p jn. on Sunday 
continuing each year; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, from the tune the 
child's school is regularly dismissed on Friday until 7 pjn. on Sunday, 
unless the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(b)(i); 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes 
shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend 
visitation schedule; 
(d) if a holiday fells on a regularly scheduled school day, the noneosto-
dial parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance S(t echoed for that 
school day; 
(e) (i) tf a hoHdayfiBJls on a weekend or on a Friday tff Monday and the 
total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free 
from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent 
shall be entitled to tins lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, visitation over a 
scheduled holiday weekend may begin from the time the child's school 
is regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 
p.m. on the last day of the holiday weekend; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after tb? actual birthdaie 
beginning at 3 pja. until 9 p-m,; at the discretion of the noncustodial 
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Humajilfcghts Day beginning 6 pan. cm 
7 pm. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to 
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning as 6 p.m. on the day 
school lets out for the holiday until 7 pjn- cm the Sunday before school 
resumes; 
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tiv) Memorial Day beginning 6 pjn. on Friday until Monday at 7 
p,mf unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p . a on the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7 pan. on the holiday; and 
(vil) th^ first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
Subsection 80-3-32(3Xb) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 
1 p.m., so long as die entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent, is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
li) childfe birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 pan. until 9 
pML; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 pjn. on Friday until 7 pm. on 
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to 
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until U 
p j n on the holiday; 
CM Labor Day beginning at 6 p A . on Friday until Monday at 7 
pjs . unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) the ftU school break, if applicable, commonly known as UJSA. 
weekend beginning at S pjn, on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p A . 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period oftime to which the 
noncustodial parentis completely1 entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p m . the day before the holiday 
until 7 pjn. on the holiday; 
fvii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 pjn. until 
Sunday at 7 pjn; and 
(viii) die second portion of die Christmas school vacation as defined 
in Subsection 30>3«32(3Xb) pine Christmas day beginning at 1 pjn. 
until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally 
divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall he spent with the natural or adoptive firther 
every year beginning at 9 aJn. until 7 pjn. on the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother 
every year beginning at 9 ajn. until 7 pjn. on the holiday; 
(j) extended visitation wt±i the noncvistodial parent may be: 
Ii) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time far the noncustodial 
parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shaU he subject to vjgitetion for ^ 
custodial parent consistent with, these guidelines; 
(It) the custodial parent shall have an Identical two-week period of 
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for 
purposes of vacation; 
0) ifthecMd is enrolled in year-roimd s c h o o l , ^ 
extended visitation shall be *4 of the vacation time fir year-round school 
breaks, provided the custodial parent has hoKday and phone visits; 
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(m) notification of extended v i s i ta t ions 
shall ba provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
fn) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hoars and for reasonable 
duration. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with, tins section fay 
either parent concerning visitation shall be made a part ofthe decree and made 
apartof the visitation order. 
Hwtoryr c. 1953, aS-frgs* enacts* by L. midt rtlsted changes; ivWsed die provSaiens 
1933,ch.m.i 5; 1907, oh. 80, f $2000, cfc. nferdsag thret-day weefcesde for Human 
97, I L KehteD^andFtrcridtnftDgiyinSvbseedoDs 
i-»-i*—^
 N a t e f c _ ^ 2000 amend- («fXB and (2XgXH); sad revised the pratf. aea^ affective Btech 10>2000, added 9obscc- ssoqurtfai^ogepnof break or Sosv^b^dur 
tions C2K*Xia teXbXH), C2X*Xu), and 0) and ID Subsection (2XfXiitt 
30-3-38- Pilot Program for Expedited Visitation Enforce-
ment. 
(X) Tfcereis established an Expedited VUitationEnfiKrcement Pilot Ptosraxn 
in the third judicial district to be administered by the Administrative Office o f 
the Courts from July 1,1996, to July 1,2003. 
(2) As used in this section; 
(a) "Mediator* means a person who: 
(0 is qualified to mediate visitation disputes under criteria estab-
lished by the Administrative Office of the Courts; and 
Cii) agrees to follow trilling guidelines established by the Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts and this section. 
(b) "Servicea to facilitate visitation* or "services" means services de-
signed to assist families in resolving visitation problems through: 
(2 counseling; 
(n) supervised visitation; 
(in) neutral drop-off and pick-up; 
(iv) educational classes; and 
(v) other related activities. 
(8) (a) Under this pilot program, if a parent files a motion in the third 
district court alleging that court-ordered visitation rights are being 
violated, the dark of the court, after assigning the case to a judge, shall 
refer the case to the administrator of this pilot program for assignment to 
a mediator. 
(b) Upon receipt of a case, the mediator shall: 
(i) meet with the parents to address visitation issues within IS 
days of the motion being filed; 
(ii) assess the situation; 
(ni) facilitate a n agreement on visitation between the parents; and 
(frr) determine whether a referral to a service provider under 
Subsection (3)(e) i s warranted. 
(c) While a case is in mediation, a mediator may refer the parents to a 
service provider designated by the Deportment of Human Services for 
services to facilitate visitation if. 
(i) the services may be of significant benefit to the parents; or 
(ii) (A) a mediated agreement between the parents i s unKkety; and 
(B) the services may facilitate an agreement 
(d) At any time during mediation, a mediator shall terminate mediation 
and transfer the case to the administrator of the pilot program fin: referral 
IN THE **+fs*A DTSTRICT COURT 
Davis .COUNTY. STAT60FUTAH 
FENNY LEONA MACKKY 
vs. 
ROBERT KENNETH MACKEY 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SPLIT CUSTODV) 
Civil *« 9 9 4 7 0 0 0 1 3 
MOTHER FATHER COMBINED 
1. EtterThtfttf natural and adapted^ 
whom support is to be awarded 
2. Divide the number of children with cadi [rtrem by file combined mimber of 
children listed in Line I. 
3e~ Enler die f:»nWs art mother^ £roa 
Instructions for dcffntEkm of income. 
3b. Erxer previously ordered alimony that U actually paid. (Do not enter 
allfliony ordered for mis ease). 
3c. Enter previously ordered child auppon. (Do not eoccrobHsocions ordered 
IbrthccmTdrcninLtttel). 
3d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount fiom Line 12 of the Children m 
Homo Worksheet forriiher parens. 
4. Subtract Lines 3b, 3c. and 34 from 3a. Toil Is the Acj|'usKd Gross Ineome 
for chfldstiogort purposes. 
3. Take cne COMBINED figure In Lino 4 and d» number or children In Une l 
io fc Support Tfcee, Find the Base CbnatinedSupponOblipftn. Enter it 
& Divide each parent's adjusted mondu> fiross In Lino 4 by iho COMBINED 
adjusted rrwnddy gross in Lmn 4» 
7. Multiply Line 5 by Ltoe 6 for each parem m obtam each parent's share of 
ihe Base Support Cfeliaadorv 
t Multiply che isothofs Line 7 by the fiiihcr's Line 2. Tliis is ihe mothers 
obllptSoafoihe father. 
p.lMiplytteftttlieitUn^^ 
obtifnrion to Ihc mother. _ 
tSSSSSSSSBESBBSSSESSSSSESSBBBBSZ 
I10. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWAltt: Sitae* the lesser em 
[greater amounr (OBLIGOR'S) of Lines 8 ond9.ThU«ihearoouMdieOBrJGORpaystodie 
obligee an 12 moathaofthe year. 
^SBSSSSSSSSSSSSmBSBSSSSSSBSSZ 
I I . 
12. 
13. 
Which parem is the oblifor? ( ) (XX Father 
le the suffoir award feserne as tepin^ KB Yes 
IfMOr»Mfcrrite«ttfl«MtfoArBffrg and an*«icr enmhar 13-
What were lbs reasons stated by the court for die deviation? 
( ) proper^ jetdement 
( JcxccisWe debts of eSerrumage 
( ) absence of need of toe custoawl parent 
( *«"«* . 
I iVo 
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